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36 1

INTRODUCTION
t

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court declared illegal
the military commissions convened by the George W. Bush administra3
2
tion for the trial of alleged war criminals detained in its War on Terror

at its camps on Guantdinamo Bay ("the camps"). 4 Hamdan is a bold,
* Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Culture, Columbia University School of Law;
Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University; Ph.D.
Candidate, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, UC-Berkeley; J.D., Boalt Hall School of
Law, UC-Berkeley (2005).
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. Though the term of art unlawful enemy combatants is used by the government to refer to
many counterterrorist detainees, I opt for the term war criminals,since unlawful belligerency is, in
essence, a war crime. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 2, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
3. Though the military offensive authorized by Congress, in and after which the
Guantdnamo detainees were apprehended, was waged against al Qaeda and the Taliban, the
President's order establishing the Guantdnamo commissions speaks to broadly defined
"international terrorism" against U.S. interests. Similarly, the President's order authorizes
detention and trial for acts of terrorism beyond war crimes. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001).
4. The present Guantdnamo camps consist of Camp Delta (a 612-unit facility), Camp Iguana
(which was initially used to hold detainees under the age of 16, all of whom have since been
released, and subsequently was used for detainees recognized as non-combatants but deemed
unable to be repatriated), and Camp X-Ray (which was a temporary facility replaced by Camp
Delta). See Global Security.org, Guantinamo Bay-Camp Delta, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/facility/guantanamo-baydelta.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007); GlobalSecurity.org,
Guantdnamo Bay, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay.htm
(last
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oblique departure from precedent5 and a rebuke not only of the commissions at issue in Hamdan, but also of the administration's counterterrorism policy more generally.6 The Court's aggressive and in some ways
radical opinion reflects the radical aggression of the administration's
War on Terror, emblematized by, but not limited to, the camps and commissions. Professor Neal Katyal (who served as counsel for Salim
Ahmed Hamdan) offered a characterization of the Court's prior ruling in
Rasul v. Bush7 that might well have been written of the majority opinion
in Hamdan:
By asserting that it had the ability to build an offshore facility to
evade judicial review, do what it wanted at that facility to detainees
under the auspices of the commander-in-chief power, and keep the
entire process (including its legal opinions) secret, the executive
branch appears to have provoked a[n overreactive] judicial
backlash....
But is any of this surprising, when the administration stood before the
Court asking for their blessing in turning Guantanamo Bay into a
legal black hole, where no law applied and no court would review
what they were doing to the detainees at any moment, even if the
government decided to trump up capital offenses and summarily exe-

visited Dec. 23, 2007). From 1991 to 1995, the GuantAnamo Bay Base housed camps for Haitian
refugees. See id.
5. See Justice Thomas's dissent in Hamdan:
After seeing the plurality overturn longstanding precedents in order to seize
jurisdiction over this case, and after seeing them disregard the clear prudential
counsel that they abstain in these circumstances from using equitable powers, it is
no surprise to see them go on to overrule one after another of the President's
judgments pertaining to the conduct of an ongoing war. Those Justices who today
disregard the commander-in-chief's wartime decisions, only 10 days ago deferred to
the judgment of the Corps of Engineers with regard to a matter much more within
the competence of lawyers, upholding that agency's wildly implausible conclusion
that a storm drain is a tributary of the waters of the United States. It goes without
saying that there is much more at stake here than storm drains. The plurality's
willingness to second-guess the determination of the political branches that these
conspirators must be brought to justice is both unprecedented and dangerous.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2838-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
6. The Court's holdings in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 484 (2004), and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 2798, collectively compromise,
when not condemning, many of the Bush administration's approaches to national security,
including: its general war on terrorism without limited enemy or end; military detentions beyond
the field of battle, the nation's borders, and the jurisdiction of the courts; noncompliance with
treaties and other international law; consolidated executive power over the identification,
apprehension, detention, trial, and punishment of enemy combatants and war criminals; and the
extent and independence of the commander in chiefs power generally.
7. 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
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8

cute them?
As in Rasul, the Court in Hamdan summarily rejects the administration's claim for absolute authority over the identification, apprehension,
detention, trial, and punishment of alleged combatants and war criminals
who are not U.S. citizens.9 The Court insists upon detailed congressional authorization, federal judicial review, and international legal
adherence in the administration's wars with al Qaeda or other international terrorist organizations. The Court also, in keeping with core constitutional commitments, insists upon at least some modicum of
individual rights for every person subject to the force of the U.S. government-even an allegedly illegal alien enemy combatant held by the military abroad.
To summarize the case generally, the Hamdan Court held (with
various qualifications) that:
• Congress's Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA")' ° did not
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear some habeas
claims by Guantdnamo detainees;"
" the convention of judicial abstention in matters of military justice was neither necessary nor appropriate as regards complaints
12
about the Guantdnamo commissions;
• the President had not received requisite congressional authoriza13
tion for the commissions as constituted;
• the commissions should have-but did not-adhere generally
to:

" the procedural rules governing courts-martial;' 4
O
the requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
15

("UCMJ");
" the U.S. common law of war; 16 and
O
the international laws of war, including the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War ("GPW"). 17
8. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2004
CATO SUp. CT. REv. 49, 49, 55 (2004).
9. The administration's foundational differentiation between citizen and alien enemies
comprises one of its most obviously constitutionally questionable policies and is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 331.
10. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified in scattered sections of
10, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
11. 126 S. Ct. at 2764.
12. Id. at 2793.
13. Id. at 2774.

14. Id. at 2756.
15. Id. at 2791. The UCMJ is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
16. 126 S. Ct. at 2758.
17. Id. at 2794-95; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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Four justices held, moreover, that conspiracy (for which Hamdan was
charged) is not a war crime and that the commissions were illegal
because they exclude defendants from many parts of the judicial process, thus violating international law. 8 Justice Kennedy was the only
member of the majority to decline to affirm these propositions, but he
did not reject them. 9
Hamdan thus ruled against most of the D.C. Circuit's holding in the
2
case, " the Government's arguments at bar, and the President's conduct
in the camps generally. However, the Hamdan majority focused on
structural rather than substantive issues, and statutory rather than constitutional issues. The bulk of the opinion insists upon the importance of
legislative authorization for, and the impact of extant legislative limits
upon, the Executive's counterterrorist policies. Congress's predictable
passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA") 21 immediately after Hamdan, however, made clear that the Court's emphasis upon
congressional consonance with executive acts merely propelled a more
explicit legislative complicity with the executive camps and commissions, thereby delaying the substantive resolution of the detainees'
claims.
In what follows, I critique Hamdan, signaling the constitutional
matters that the Court must yet address and I hope will in its review of
the MCA this term.22 I focus on three dimensions of the Hamdan opinion: its interpretation of the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions; its
interpretation of the UCMJ's requirement of uniformity among military
tribunals; and its interpretation of the UCMJ's requirement that military
commissions adhere to the laws of war. I argue that the Court's interpretations of congressional statutes should have come alongside a similar engagement with the Constitution. The Court's contentment to
resolve Hamdan by reference to statutory law has left Congress unable
to sensibly reconstruct the Executive's unacceptable system of military
justice, and has left the detainees-like Mr. Hamdan-in circumstances
that, if his allegations are true, run afoul of our most basic constitutional
obligations.
After critiquing Hamdan's constitutional silences, I offer constitutional analyses of the camps and commissions. My analyses center on
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which provides jurisdic18. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2758; see also id. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2804, 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
21. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 &
42 U.S.C.).
22. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078

(2007).
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tional, normative, historical, and doctrinal grounds for hearing and
redressing the detainees' claims. 23 To elaborate the application of the
Fifth Amendment to the detainees, I first make several jurisprudential
arguments regarding the ways in which humanitarian law applies to conflicts, like the U.S. war with al Qaeda, which seems in many respects to
fall beyond the specific terms and texts of humanitarian law, while
seeming in other respects entirely consonant with such law. This general jurisprudential discussion suggests the moral and philosophical
foundation upon which my arguments about the Fifth Amendment are
based.
Humanitarian law necessarily transcends the inherently limited and
contingent texts that effectuate it. Humanitarian law precedes, grounds,
and exceeds the positive stipulations of particular U.S. and international
laws, and it provides the very meaning of due process in the context of
counterterrorist detentions. Consequently-affirming and elaborating
claims by others-I argue that, just as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause incorporates and imposes the federal Bill of Rights upon
the criminal proceedings of the several states, the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause should incorporate and impose international humanitarian law upon the Guantdinamo camps and commissions. The Court's
due process precedents from World War I to the War on Terror support
my interpretation both formally and substantively. In sum, I argue that
the Fifth Amendment demands equal due process protections for every
person detained by U.S. forces in every military engagement, regardless
of-and indeed contrary to-the executive's creation and the legislature's authorization of exceptional systems of detention, indictment,
trial, and punishment in the War on Terror. Such due process not only
includes but also exceeds the particular terms and positive obligations of
specific international instruments, enshrining instead the most general
and vital aim of such instruments-the mitigation of the horrors incumbent upon violence among political communities.
Whether readers share my conclusions, I hope here to demonstrate
the need for the Court-and all of us-to engage directly with central
moral, political, and constitutional questions regarding the camps, the
23. This argument follows that of David D. Caron and others, in their amicus brief in Rasul.
See Brief of International Law and Jurisdiction Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 69144
[hereinafter Brief of International Law and Jurisdiction Professors]. This brief is discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 219-28. For further discussion of the absence and aptness of Fifth
Amendment analysis in Hamdan, see also George P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427, 431-32, 434 (2007); Jana Singer,
Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759, 766-67 (2007). See generally
Cass R. Sunstein, ClearStatement Principlesand National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006
SuP. CT. REV. 1 (2006).
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commissions, and the rule of humanitarian law over nation-states'
24
counterterrorist programs and policies. As the Court noted in Hamdi
and Rasul, 25 the pleas and allegations of the Guantdnamo detainees
strike to the very heart of our constitutional text and tradition. By failing
to address the constitutional status of the Guantdinamo camps, tribunals,
and commissions, the Court in Hamdan truly tragically deferred pleas
for aid regarding state actions that some claim are necessary and proper
for national security under the Constitution, but that others call exercises
in tyranny and torture.
H.

BIRTH OF THE CAMPS

On September 18, 2001 Congress issued its Authorization for Use
of Military Force ("AUMF") 26 against those responsible for the attacks
of September 11. Two months later, the George W. Bush administration
issued a Military Order ("Mil. Order 2001"1) that initiated military detentions and tribunals for non-citizens whom the President suspects of
(1) being or having been members of al Qaeda;
(2) otherwise committing, conspiring to commit, aiding, or abetting international terrorist acts causing, threatening to cause, or
intended to cause harm to U.S. citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
2
(3) knowingly harboring persons described above. 1
The Guantdinamo commissions could convene anywhere and anytime
under procedures to be determined by the Secretary of Defense.2 8 Mil.
Order 2001 itself established minimal processes and structures for the
commissions, including: full and fair trials for those accused; internal
authority over matters of fact and law; admission of all evidence with
reasonably probative value; conviction and sentencing upon a two-thirds
vote of the military officers comprising the commission; and review
only by the President or the Secretary of Defense if the President so
designates.29 Mil. Order 2001 also authorized and initiated indefinite
detentions of suspects independent of any subsequent trial before the
commissions.30 Taken together, the provisions of the President's 2001
Order established "the role[s] of legislator, policeman, prosecutor, judge,
and court of appeal, concentrating all of these powers in the executive
24. 542 U.S. 507, 532-33 (2004).
25. 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
26. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).

27. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001).

28. See id. at 57,834, 57,835.
29. Id. at 57,835.
30. Id. at 57,834.
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branch ... to revise the jurisdictional design of the system of criminal
justice. '"31 Modifications to the commissions' structure and process
were issued, pursuant to Mil. Order 2001, on March 22, 2002 ("Mil.
Order 2002") and August 31, 2005 ("Mil. Order 2005").32
After ordering the creation of the commissions, the administration
contended that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions
by the Guantdnamo detainees; the international laws of war enshrined in
the Geneva Conventions-including those granting protections to prisoners of war-did not apply to the detainees; and the executive branch
possessed plenary constitutional power to apprehend, detain, identify,
try, punish, and hear appeals for the detainees. 33 The Supreme Court in
Rasul and Hamdi disagreed, asserting not only federal jurisdiction over
detainees' habeas petitions, but also requiring more regular judicial process in the Guantdinamo camps to review and confirm whether detainees
were in fact combatants.34 In response to these cases, the administration
established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") to conduct
such reviews.35
Through the CSRT's and the camps' Administrative Review
Boards ("ARBs"), 242 of the Guantdnamo detainees had been discharged from the camps as of July 20, 2005.36 Of that number, 174 were
released outright-and thus the ARBs acknowledged either that these
individuals had been wrongly detained or were otherwise not posing a
threat to the U.S.-while sixty-seven of the detainees were transferred to
the custody of other governments.37
31. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259, 1265 n.24, 1266 (2002) [hereinafter Katyal & Tribe]. These
scholars contend that the order thus violates the precedent of Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957),
which found that "blending of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one person or even in
one branch of the Government is ordinarily regarded as the very acme of absolutism." Id. at 11.
32. Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1: Procedures for Trial by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32
C.F.R. § 9 (2005).
33. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Statement for the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Dec. 6, 2001), 2001 WL 1558164 [hereinafter Ashcroft Statement]; Memorandum
from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to Pres. George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), http:/l
news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/gnzls 12502mem2gwb3.html [hereinafter Gonzales
Memorandum].
34. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 525
(2004).
35. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Def., Combatant Status Review Trib. Order Issued (July 7,
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7530; see also
DEPUTY

SEC'Y OF DEF., MEMORANDUM

COMBATANT

STATUS

FOR THE SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, ORDER ESTABLISHING

REVIEw TIB. (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.millnewsl

Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
36. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (July 20, 2005),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8705.
37. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:307

Hamdan's was the first case to be charged and set for trial before
the commissions. 38 Hamdan alleges that in June 2002 he was given to
U.S. authorities for a bounty and was then taken from Afghanistan to the
Guantdnamo camp.3 9 In July 2003 Hamdan was deemed eligible for
trial by commission. 0 He was then held in solitary confinement from
December 2003 until November 2004.41 Hamdan was given military
counsel in December 2003, and, in February 2004, he filed a request for
charges and a speedy trial as guaranteed by the UCMJ.4 2 His request
was rejected and the UCMJ was deemed inapplicable to Hamdan. 43 As
the Court notes: "Not until July 13, 2004, after Hamdan had commenced
this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, did the Government finally charge him with the offense for
which, a year earlier, he had been deemed eligible for trial by military
commission."'
The July 2004 statement charged Hamdan with conspiracy and
alleged that he
from on or about February 1996 to on or about November 24, 2001
...willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who
shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with
[named members of al Qaeda] to commit the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians; attacking civilian
45
objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.
The government made "no allegation that Hamdan had any command
responsibilities, played a leadership role, or participated in the planning
of any activity. 4 6
Hamdan filed his plea for a writ of mandamus or habeas corpus in
April 2004. 47 Hamdan's case raised different concerns from those in
Hamdi and Rasul, namely whether the process established for the com38. See Scott Higham, Bin Laden Aide Is Charged at First Tribunal, WASH. POST, Aug. 25,
2004, at A01; National Briefing Washington: U.S. To Appeal Ruling On Detainees' P.O.W.
Status, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 13, 2004, at A13 ("The Bush administration served notice that it would
appeal a judge's ruling that stopped proceedings in the first trial by a military commission of a
suspected member of Al Qaeda[, Salim Ahmed Hamdan].").
39. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184),
2006 WL 53988 ("Over four years ago, [Hamdan] was captured in Afghanistan by indigenous
forces while attempting to return his family to Yemen. After being turned over to American
forces in exchange for a bounty, he was taken in June 2002 to Guantanamo Bay, where he was
placed with the general detainee population.").
40. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006).
41. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 3.
42. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760; see 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2000).
43. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 2761 (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 4.
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missions in Military Orders 2001, 2003, and 2005 were just.48 Unlike
the CSRTs, the commissions were convened to try and punish war
crimes or other offenses as described in Mil. Order 2001. 49
In November 2004 Judge Robertson of the D.C. District Court partially granted Hamdan's habeas petition to review his pending trial by
commission.5 ° Judge Robertson rejected the Government's motion to
dismiss and its demand for judicial abstention, holding the following:
* only violations of the laws of war may be tried by the
commissions;
* the GPW is enforceable in federal court;
* Hamdan should be tried by court-martial unless his status as
being not a POW under the GPW is confirmed; and
5
* the commissions as constituted violate the UCMJ. '
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered the Government's appeal of Robertson's holding.52 The
panel included Judge-now Chief Justice-John Roberts.53 In a
remarkable convergence that deeply troubled advocates, teachers, and
others, Judge Roberts and the Court of Appeals announced their opinion
in Hamdan's case reversing the court below on July 15, 2005. 5 ' The
opinion was issued mere days before President Bush announced Roberts
as his nominee for the Supreme Court and the very same day on which
Roberts interviewed with the President. 5 Moreover, in Roberts's subsequent confirmation hearings, it became clear that the judge had met with
Attorney General Gonzales and other members of the President's staff as
early as April 1-six days prior to oral arguments in Hamdan's case.5 6
48. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37-39, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
50. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
51. Id. at 158, 164-66.
52. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 36.
53. See id. at 34 (listing Judge Roberts as a member of the three-judge panel).
54. See id. at 33; see also Stephen Gillers et al., Improper Advances: Talking Dream Jobs
with the Judge Out of Court, SLATE, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2124603/?nav=tap3.
55. Bush Nominates Roberts to Supreme Court, CNN.coM, July 20, 2005, http://

www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/07/19/scotus.main/index.html.
56. See Conflict of Interest? Roberts' Interviews with White House Officials Priorto Gitmo
Ruling Raise Questions About Impartiality (Democracy Now! broadcast Aug. 18, 2005)

(transcription of an interview with David Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2005/8/18/conflict_of_interestroberts_
interviews_with; Gillers, supra note 54 ("Hamdan's lawyer was completely in the dark about
these interviews until Roberts revealed them to the Senate. (Full disclosure: Professor Luban [coauthor of this article] is a faculty colleague of Hamdan's principal lawyer.) Did administration
officials or Roberts ask whether it was proper to conduct interviews for a possible Supreme Court
nomination while the judge was adjudicating the government's much-disputed claims of
expansive presidential powers? Did they ask whether it was appropriate to do so without
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The judgment of the panel, written by Judge Randolph and joined
by Roberts and Judge Williams (in part), overturned the District Court in
most every respect by:
* holding that the AUMF and UCMJ authorized the commissions
57
as presently constituted;
* finding the GPW not enforceable in federal court; 58 and
" finding the war with al Qaeda exempt from the GPW in any
event. 5 9
Hamdan appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in
November 2005.60 In December 2005, between the grant and the hearing of the case , Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
("DTA"),6 1 which-along with many other regulations-specified
restricted review processes for Guantdnamo detainees, deeply limiting
the federal judiciary's power to hear the detainees' claims on several
fronts.62
Based on the DTA, the Government moved for the Court to dismiss
Hamdan's appeal for want of jurisdiction. As Justice Scalia would later
note, the DTA was identified by at least one Senator as expressly barring
the Court from hearing Hamdan's case.6 3 The Court declined to rule on
the motion to dismiss under the DTA until after its consideration of the
case on the merits.'
Hamdan challenged the Guantdinamo commissions on many
grounds, including their:
* exclusion of the accused from crucial portions of trials,6 5
" provision of no independent review beyond the executive
branch,66 and
" admission of evidence deemed to hold "probative value" to a
informing opposing counsel? If they had asked, they would have discovered that the interviews
violated federal law on the disqualification of judges.").
57. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38.

58. See id. at 40.
59. See id. at 41.
60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
61. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, fit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified in scattered sections of
10, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
62. Id. § 1005. The DTA is discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes 84-197.
63. "'An earlier part of the amendment provides that no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to consider the application for writ of habeas corpus. . . .Under the language of
exclusive jurisdiction in the DC Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction to
hear the Hamdan case ... ' Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2816 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 151
CONG. REc. S12796 (Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)).
64. See id. at 2762 (majority opinion).

65. U.S. Dept. of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R.

§ 9.6(b)(3) (2005).
66. Id. § 9.6(h)(6).
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reasonable person, including evidence obtained by coercion and
even, as Hamdan claimed, evidence obtained by torture.67
Hamdan argued that such procedures violate U.S. statutory and common
law, as well as international law and custom.69 Hamdan also argued
7°
that the commissions' exclusive jurisdiction over noncitizens is illegal
and that conspiracy is not a violation of the laws of war and as such
cannot be tried by a military commission. 7 ' Hamdan's counsel also
claimed that the laws of war in any event do not apply to the administration's War on Terror.7 2 More pertinently and persuasively, one member
of Hamdan's counsel-Professor Katyal-elsewhere contested as
improper and illogical the fact that the commissions' jurisdictional
determinations hinge upon the same question as the commissions' trials
on the merits-whether the detainees are in fact unlawful combatants,
thus not deserving of POW status or other protections, thus subject to
73

military commissions, and thus also guilty.

67. Id. § 9.6(d)(1).
68. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 6, 22 (claiming that U.S. common law affords
the right to be present and confront one's accusers) (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,
455 (1912); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372, 375 (1892); United States v. Daulton, 45
M.J. 212, 219 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. Dean, 13 M.J. 676, 678 (A.C.M.R. 1982)).
69. Id. at 23 ("[T]he Government has offered no authority that permits a commission to be
convened without rights of presence and confrontation. Nor have they offered anything to suggest
that Congress has authorized a commission whose own procedures violate the laws of war.").
70. The Petitioner relied on federal statutes and U.S. Supreme Court case law:
Congress has prohibited having non-citizens subject "to different punishments,
pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien." 18 U.S.C. 242. This
statute forbids "being subjected to different punishments, pains or penalties by
reason of alienage ... than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens." United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). No past commission, including [Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)] itself, excluded citizens by design.
Id. at 24. Hamdan's counsel also argued that there might be a claim on this point under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2000), which requires evidentiary, procedural, penal, and other legal treatment for "all
persons" to be equal to that of "white citizens." See id. at 24 n.16. However, § 1981 was
amended in 1991 in a manner that might restrict its application to the federal government. See
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1298-1304 & n.24 (discussing the legitimacy of the
commissions' disparate treatment of noncitizens under § 1981, as well as under the guarantee of
equal protection imputed to the Fifth Amendment).
71. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 27-30. Four justices accepted this
argument. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777-86 (2006).
72. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 30-35. The Hamdan majority implicitly rejects
this claim by applying the laws of war to the administration's War on Terror through the UCMJ.
See infra text accompanying notes 148-97.
73. Katyal and Tribe note the following:
[The status] of al Qaeda members as "unlawful belligerents" is incapable of being
ascertained apart from their ultimate guilt of planning and executing acts that
massacre unarmed civilians and thereby violate the laws of war. The result is that
any determination today, either by the President or by an Article 1II court on habeas
review, of the jurisdiction of the military tribunals is necessarily bound up with the
merits of the substantive charges against a particular defendant.
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The administration claimed that the Court was jurisdictionally foreclosed from hearing the case because of the DTA, and that-even absent
this strip of jurisdiction-the Court should abstain from hearing the case
under principles of comity between the federal and military-justice systems. It further contended that the Court should at present forbear from
hearing Hamdan's claims, because the structural and procedural flaws he
alleged (regarding the UCMJ, GPW, evidentiary standards, and internal
appeals) could and should be heard only after the commission's proceedings concluded."4 To do otherwise, the administration contended,
would be fatally premature." Regarding the President's authority to
institute the commissions, the administration claimed that such authority
was duly granted by Congress through the AUMF, 7 6 but that even without that grant, the establishment of commissions to try war crimes is
inherent in the conduct of war, such that the Commander in Chief
Clause of the Constitution and indeed the laws of war generally, conferred the power to install the Guantdinamo commissions upon the President and his administration.7 7 The administration argued the following:
commissions may be convened beyond the battlefield;7 8 conspiracy is a
war crime; 7 9 non-citizens may be tried by commissions; 80 the GPW provides no rights that are enforceable in U.S. courts;8" the GPW does not
apply to al Qaeda combatants in any event;82 and, Hamdan-as a noncitizen-does not enjoy the protections of the U.S. Constitution
abroad.8 3
III.

JUDGING THE COMMISSIONS: THE CASE OF
SALIM AHMED HAMDAN

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Hamdan along with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Kennedy (in part), concluded that:
the DTA did not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas claims by detainees, like Mr. Hamdan, which were pend84
ing as of the DTA's enactment;
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1286.
74. See Respondents' Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126
S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184); Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 7-9, 11-13.
75. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 12-15.
76. id. at 15-20.
77. Id. at 20-23.
78. Id. at 27.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 28-30.
81. Id. at 30-36.
82. Id. at 37-42.
83. Id. at 43.
84. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006).
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• the convention of judicial abstention in matters of military justice is not required, nor appropriate, as regards complaints about
85
the Guantdnamo commissions;
* the President had not received congressional authorization for
the commissions as they were constituted, and the laws and customs of war do not grant the President the power to create86 such
commissions absent explicit congressional authorization;
• the commissions should have-but did not-adhere generally
to:
o rules governing federal courts and courts-martial, because
the UCMJ requires uniformity among tribunals absent a
87
showing of impracticability;
o
the requirements of the UCMJ generally, which inaugurate
88
and govern the commissions; 89
o the U.S. common law of war; and
o the international laws of war, including the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, because-at the time when
Hamdan was decided-the UCMJ explicitly incorporated
such law into its provisions governing military tribunals.90
A.

Jurisdictionand the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

The Court first held that the DTA did not clearly strip the Supreme
Court-or presumably any federal court-of its jurisdiction to hear
Hamdan's case, because the provision applicable thereto did not make
explicit its reach to cases pending at the time of the DTA 's enactment.9'
Hamdan's case began prior to Congress's passage of the DTA, and as
such the majority concluded it may proceed. 92
The DTA's "Procedures for Status Review of Detainees Outside
the United States," regarding judicial review9 3 of actions at the Guantinamo camp, stipulate that:
* "Except as provided [in the DTA], . . . no court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" 94 habeas petitions, or
85. Id. at 2793.
86. Id. at 2774.

87. Id. at 2756.
88. Id. at 2791. The UCMJ is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).

89. 126 S.Ct. at 2758.
90. Id. at 2794-95; see also Geneva Convention, supra note 17.
91. 126 S. Ct. at 2764.
92. See id.
93. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740-44 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000)) (including reporting requirements incumbent upon the

Secretary of Defense).
94. Id.§ 1005(e)(1).
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any other claim or action against the U.S. government or its
agents on behalf of non-citizen Guant~namo Detainees who either
are, or were previously and properly, in custody at the camp;9 5
" The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals holds exclusive-and lim96
ited-jurisdiction to review findings of the CSRTs;
* The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals holds exclusive-and limited-jurisdiction to review findings of the commissions.

7

Regarding the latter provisions governing review of findings by the
Guant~inamo commissions, the DTA mandates review by the Court of
Appeals if a detainee receives a sentence of death or more than ten years
in prison." All other review is discretionary. 9 9 Moreover, the DTA circumscribes the D.C. Circuit's review as to whether the commission's
decision conforms to Mil. Order 2001 and 2005 (or its successor)' ° and
whether-to the degree applicable-the commission's "standards and
procedures" conform to the Constitution.' °1
The DTA states that it takes effect on the date of its enactment, and
that the provisions concerning the stripping and restriction of federal
jurisdiction in "Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) [regarding
review of decisions by the CSRTs and commissions] shall apply with
respect to any claim . . . that is pending on or after the date of the

'02
enactment of this Act."'
As the Court in Hamdan notes, however, "The Act is silent about
whether paragraph (1) of subsection (e) [regarding detainees' habeas
'0 3
petitions] 'shall apply' to claims pending on the date of enactment."'
Nonetheless:
The Government argues that §§ 1005(e)(1) and 1005(h) had the
immediate effect, upon enactment, of repealing federal jurisdiction
not just over detainee habeas actions yet to be filed but also over any
such actions then pending in any federal court-including this Court.
Accordingly, it argues, we lack jurisdiction to review the Court of
Appeals' decision below.' °4
The provisions of the DTA not discussing habeas petitions by
Guantinamo detainees-those regarding appeals of the CSRTs' and

95. Id.
96. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(A).
97. Id. § 1005(e)(3)(A).
98. Id. § 1005(e)(3)(B)(i).

99. Id. § 1005(e)(3)(B)(ii).
100. Id. § 1005(e)(3)(D)(i).
101. Id. § 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii). However, the administration's Hamdan brief contended that the
Constitution is inapplicable to noncitizens such as Hamdan.
102. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(h).
103. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763 (2006).

104. Id.
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commissions' final decisions-clearly apply to all cases pending upon
enactment of the DTA. Consequently, Stevens opined that it would be
improper to construe Paragraph 1 to strip the Court of its jurisdiction to
hear Hamdan's case given the conspicuous absence of language applying Paragraph 1 to pending cases, the presence of such language in other
provisions and Congress's rejection of earlier drafts of the DTA that
contained such language in Paragraph 1.105
By so doing, the Court avoids questions about whether the DTA
accords with the Constitution's Suspension Clause concerning the great
writ of habeas corpus.' °6 The Court likewise avoids deciding whether
Congress's stripping of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is acceptable or
excessive under the Exceptions Clause of Article 111.1°7 Thus, the Court
also avoids judging the general intent and effect of the DTA under the
Constitution regarding review of the CSRTs and commissions.
However, Justice Scalia-because he reads the DTA to clearly prohibit the federal courts from hearing detainees' pending habeas petitions-must consider whether the DTA is constitutionally permissible
under the Suspension and Exceptions Clauses. °8 Scalia contends that
the Constitution's Suspension Clause poses no problem in Hamdan'sor any noncitizen detainee's-case. 0 9 Per Scalia, under Johnson v.
Eisentrager"° the great writ need not be extended to noncitizens held
outside the territory of the United States by military forces."' In making this argument, Scalia reduces to "ill-considered dicta" the Court's
conclusion in Rasul that the camps at Guantdinamo are in every relevant
respect under the exclusive control of the U.S. government, and thus are
indeed U.S. territory for practical judicial purposes."'
Scalia wisely buttresses his argument-that the DTA's jurisdictionstripping provisions do not violate the Suspension Clause-upon other
grounds than this shady reading of Rasul. He argues that the DTA's
provision for review of CSRT and commission proceedings by the D.C.
105. Id. at 2754.
106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.").
107. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
108. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2810-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2817-18.
110. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
111. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004)). Scalia further cites to Eisentrager:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the
writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time
and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing
in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.
Id. at 2818 (quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 768).
112. Id.
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Circuit Court of Appeals provides a sufficient alternative to habeas hear1 13
ings in federal court, and as such poses no constitutional problem.
Scalia then responds to Hamdan's-and the majority's-position that
the DTA' s provision of review for serious sentences, even if adequate as
an alternative when activated, would exclude Hamdan because he faces
a sentence of less than ten years.' 14 Scalia counters that the challenges
Hamdan and the majority raise regarding the commissions could be
raised before the D.C. Circuit irrespective of Hamdan's sentence,
because these challenges allege inconsistency with the Constitution, and
1 15
thus would warrant review.
The D.C. Circuit thus retains jurisdiction to consider [Hamdan's]
claims on postdecision review, and ... the DTA leaves unaffected
[the Supreme Court's] certiorari jurisdiction ... to review the D.C.
Circuit's decisions ....
Thus, the DTA merely defers our jurisdiction

to consider [Hamdan's] claims; it does not eliminate that jurisdiction.
It constitutes neither an "inadequate" nor an116"ineffective" substitute
for [Hamdan's] pending habeas application.
As such, there is no conflict with the Suspension Clause according to
Justice Scalia.
Regarding the Exceptions Clause, Scalia comes to a related
conclusion:
Though it does not squarely address the issue, the Court hints
ominously that "the Government's preferred reading" [of the DTA]
would "rais[e] grave questions about Congress' authority to impinge
upon this Court's appellate jurisdiction, particularly in habeas cases."
It is not clear how there could be any such lurking questions, in light
of the aptly named "Exceptions Clause" of Article III, § 2, which, in
making our appellate jurisdiction subject to "such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make," explicitly permits exactly what Congress has done here. But any doubt our prior
cases might have created on this score is surely chimerical in this
case. As just noted, the exclusive-review provisions provide a substitute for habeas review adequate to satisfy the Suspension Clause,
which forbids the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. A fortiori
they provide a substitute adequate to satisfy any implied substantive
limitations, whether real or imaginary, upon the Exceptions Clause,
113. Id. ("This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that 'the substitution of a collateral remedy
which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not
constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.' ") (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
381 (1977)).
114. See id. at 2788 (majority opinion).
115. See id. at 2815-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii), div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, 2743 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)).
116. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2819 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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.".

Because the majority read the DTA to allow federal review of habeas
petitions pending at the time of the DTA's enactment, the constitutional
questions Scalia confronts go unaddressed by the majority, meriting only
the ominous hints that Scalia chides. As such, the constitutionality of the
DTA itself remains entirely uncertain. Through its perhaps defensible,
but profoundly contorted, reading of the DTA, the Court allows itself to
speak to what it ultimately finds to be the Government's unjust treatment and trial of Mr. Hamdan. However, by doing so in this manner,
the Court failed to reach crucial questions regarding the Government's
capacity to suspend habeas corpus and to minimize federal review of the
camps and commissions.
B.

Military Due Process Under U.S. and International Law

After discussing the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the DTA
and the convention of judicial comity regarding systems of military jus18
tice, the Court turns to the effect of the UCMJ upon the commissions.'
Through its reading of the UCMJ, the Court condemns the commissions
for their failure to sufficiently resemble judicial process in courts-martial, the requirements of the UCMJ generally, the U.S. common law of
war, and the international laws of war." 9
The Court's holding is based upon legislative regulations governing
military judicial process for courts-martial, commissions, and other
tribunals as found in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial:2 °
The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military commissions on
compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also
with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the
"rules and precepts of the law of nations."''
The Court rejected the Government's contention that the DTA provided
a sufficient venue for raising challenges under the UCMJ after a final
decision had been reached.' 2 2 Stevens noted that Hamdan's charge of
conspiracy would not yield a sentence severe enough to warrant the
exceedingly limited review established by the DTA. 23 The Court simi117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. See id. at 2790 (majority opinion).
119. See id. at 2790-98.
120. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2000 ed.), available at http://
www.jag.navy.milldocuments/mcm2000.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL].
121. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
122. See id. at 2787.
123. See id. at 2788; see also Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
§ 1005(e)(3), div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, 2743 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2000)).
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larly rejected the Government's contention that Hamdan's claims before
trial were improper since it should be assumed the commission would be
conducted in good faith and with good law.'1 4 Stevens rightly noted
reasons to assume the contrary, "that the procedures employed during
Hamdan's trial will violate the law .... One of Hamdan's complaints is
that he 5will be, and indeed already has been, excluded from his own
2
trial."1
1.

UNIFORMITY AMONG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

Before passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"), 1 2 6 Article 36 of the UCMJ stipulated that the President may
construct procedures for "courts-martial, military commissions and other
military tribunals," which were required to, "so far as [the President]
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts."' 27 Before the MCA, such procedures-irrespective of any impracticable and thus inapplicable federal criminal procedures-were also required "not [to] be contrary to or inconsistent with
this chapter [of the UCMJ]. ' ' ' 28 Moreover, the pre-MCA Article 36
required that "[a]ll rules and regulations made under [it] shall be uni' 12 9
form insofar as practicable."
Consequently, the Court construed the UCMJ's provisions on
courts-martial, commissions, and other military tribunals to suggest that
such diverse tribunals should be generally identical in procedure. 3o The
Court reasoned that the distinction between courts-martial and military
commissions was traditionally-and still ought to be-a distinction as to
jurisdiction rather than process.'
Courts-martial, of course, hold personal jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces, whereas military
124. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788.
125. Id.
126. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 &
42 U.S.C.).
127. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 836(b).
130. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788.
131. See id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 19-20 n.10. In arguing this claim,

Hamdan's counsel contended that "[h]istorical practice, legal commentary, and military
regulations all confirm that commissions follow court-martial rules." Id. (citing ROLLIN A. IVES,
A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW (1879) ("The forms of procedure . . . are the same as before

courts-martial");

WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS

(2d ed., Amo Press 1979)

(1886)). Hamdan's counsel also cited the 2000 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial, which
commands that "[m]ilitary commissions ... shall be guided by the appropriate principles of law

and rules of procedures and evidence prescribed for courts-martial."
MARTIAL, supra note 120, at 1-1.

MANUAL

FOR COURTS-
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commissions might be convened to hold jurisdiction over war criminals
in the midst of conflict. The Court noted that in the U.S. Civil War,
commissions such as those at issue in Hamdan were "constituted in a
similar manner and their proceedings . ..conducted according to the
same general rules as courts-martial in order to prevent abuses which
might otherwise arise."13' 2
Hamdan chiefly complained of, and the Court centered its opinion
on, the following:
(1) "the inconsistencies . . .between":133
(a) "[section] 6 of the Commission Order, which permits
exclusion of the accused from proceedings and denial of
his access to evidence"' 34 and
(b) "the UCMJ's requirement that '[a]ll. ...proceedings' other
than votes and deliberations by courts-martial 'shall be
made a part of the record and shall be in the presence of the
accused' ";131 and,
(2) the fact that "the Commission Order dispenses with virtually all
136
evidentiary rules applicable in courts-martial."'
The Government urged the opposite conclusion: Persons tried by
the commissions are not guaranteed the process due to defendants in
courts-martial. 37 Hamdan's counsel countered that on this point the
39
138
precedent set by the Court in In re Yamashita no longer controls.1
Since Yamashita, Congress has enacted the UCMJ, which restated,
altered, and superseded the Articles of War under which Yamashita was
decided, and offered no protections to alleged alien-enemy war criminals
abroad.' 4 ° The Court accepted Hamdan's counsel's position and
resoundingly rejected Yamashita's precedent on these matters:
132. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788 (quoting 1 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF
(Daniel S. Lamont et al. eds.,
Washington, Government Printing Office 1894) (discussing General Orders No. 1 of the Civil
War)). The Hamdan Court also noted that during the Vietnam and Korean Wars, "procedural
THE OFFIciAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES

parity was espoused as a background assumption." Id.
133. Id. at 2790.
134. Id.

135. Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C.A. § 839(c) (West 2007)).
136. Id.
137. Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 44-47.
138. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).

139. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 23.
140. See id. at 23-24 ("[The Court of Appeals] panel replaced the UCMJ with the old Articles
of War from Yamashita. Article 2 of those Articles did not extend procedural protections to
persons facing commissions. But as the district court held, the UCMJ supplanted Yamashita.

Over the Army JAG's objection, it broadened Article 2 to include both 'prisoners of war' and
'persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United
States.'") (citations omitted).
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[A] glaring historical exception to this general rule [of uniformity
between courts-martial and commissions]. The procedures and evidentiary rules used to try General Yamashita... deviated in significant respects from those then governing courts-martial. The force of
that precedent, however, has been seriously undermined by
post-World War II developments.
At least partially in response to subsequent criticism of General
Yamashita's trial, the UCMJ's codification of the Articles of War
after World War H expanded the category of persons subject thereto
to include defendants in Yamashita's (and Hamdan's) position, and
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 extended prisoner-of-war protections to individuals tried for crimes committed before their capture. The most notorious exception to the principle of uniformity,
then, has been stripped of its precedential value. 4 '
However, the Court conceded that "[t]he uniformity principle is not an
inflexible one," 14 2 asserting that courts-martials' procedures may be
altered in military commissions, "[b]ut any departure must be tailored to
the exigency that necessitates it."14' 3

The Court stopped short of explicitly condemning any particular
components of the commissions' procedures, though it disparaged many.
The Court was ultimately content to conclude generally that the President's determination under 10 U.S.C. § 836(a)-that it would be
impracticable to apply federal criminal process in military commissions-failed as a determination under 10 U.S.C. § 836(b)-that it
would be impracticable to apply principles and rules of courts-martial.14 In fact, the Court "assume[d] that complete deference is owed
[to the President's] determination [that federal criminal process is
impracticable]," but decided that "[niothing in the record... demonstrates that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in
[Hamdan's] case."145
I disagree that "complete deference" is necessary in the one
instance while "nothing" calls for deference in the other. After all, the
federal criminal process and the courts-martial process are in some
respects quite similar. How could-for example-evidentiary rules
shared by both be impracticable in the one case but not in the other?
The Court avoided naming the particular necessary or practicable
elements of courts-martial rules and procedures, instead generally chid141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788-90 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2790.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id. at 2791-92.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ing the government for "misunderstand[ing] the purpose and the history
of military commissions."' 14 6 The Court continued:
The military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a more
summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; it developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed when courtsmartial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or the subject matter ....
Article 21 did not transform the military commission from a
tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient adjudicatory tool.
Article 36, confirming as much, strikes a careful balance between
uniform procedure and the need to accommodate
exigencies that may
14 7
sometimes arise in a theater of war.
Despite recognizing the norm of uniformity not only among military
tribunals, but also among civil and military criminal courts, the Court
approached this norm as statutory procedural mandate, rather than as
substantive constitutional law.
2.

THE UCMJ'S INCORPORATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWS OF WAR

Similarly, the Court found a statutory basis in the UCMJ for
demanding that the commissions must-but at present did not-conform to the international laws of war, such as those of the 1949 Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War. 4 8 Contrary to the government's
claim, and the Court of Appeals' decision, the Hamdan Court decided
that the GPW indeed protects Mr. Hamdan and others detained in the
counterterrorist enterprises of the United States. " 9
a.

The GPW's General Application to the U.S. Military

The Court of Appeals in Hamdan had cited Eisentragerfor the proposition that under the 1929 Geneva Conventions, "responsibility for
observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political and military
authorities."' 5 o
Relying on Eisentrager, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
1949 Geneva Conventions give Hamdan and other foreign detainees no
rights or claims in U.S. courts.' 5 1 Hamdan's counsel argued against the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of Eisentrager, and argued moreover
146. Id. at 2792.
147. Id. at 2792-93.
148. See id. at 2786; see also Geneva Convention, supra note 17.
149. See 126 S. Ct. at 2793-95.
150. 415 F.3d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14
(1950)). The EisentragerCourt also noted: "Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only

through protests and intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign
governments are vindicated only by Presidential intervention." 339 U.S. at 789 n.14.
151. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39-40.
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that "the United States has implemented its obligations under the GPW
to enforcement
by statute and regulation, both of which are subject
52
through a mandamus or habeas corpus petition."'
The Court, though, declined to engage Eisentrageror other sources
on the question of the GPW's independent enforceability by
assum[ing] that "the obvious scheme" of the 1949 Conventions is
identical in all relevant respects to that of the 1929 Convention [as
construed by Eisentrager], and even that that scheme would, absent

some other provision of law, preclude Hamdan's invocation of the
Convention's provisions as an independent source of law binding the
actions and furnishing [Hamdan] with any enforceable
Government's
153
right.
Despite this most alarming assumption-which the Court undermines in
two footnotes suggesting the later Conventions do indeed furnish individual rights contra Eisentragert54 -the Court found that the GPW
nonetheless is necessarily imposed upon the commissions.155 This is so,
152. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 37-38. Here, Hamdan's counsel cited to the
following authorities: Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1091(b), 118 Stat. 1811, 2069 (2004) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801) (affirming that the United States will grant POW protections to detainees about whose
status as POWs there is doubt, until their status is determined by a competent tribunal); § 1092(a)
(requiring Defense Department procedures in keeping with international law); § 1092(b)(3)
(requiring notice to detainees in their language of the protections of Geneva Conventions); U.S.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES,
AND OTHER DETAINEES, ARMY REG. 190-8, § 1-5(a) (1997) (granting protections of the GPW to
all detainees until a "competent authority" decides otherwise) [hereinafter ARMY REG. 190-8];
§ 1-6 (requiring a "competent tribunal" to determine POW status for detainees denied such status
who assert otherwise or about whose status there is doubt).
However, even if these provisions rendered the GPW's protections for POWs and others
generally enforceable, the foregoing statute and regulation require doubt as to detainees' POW
status to trigger provisional POW status. The government has contended that there is no such
doubt about the GuantAnamo detainees, insofar as: (1) the President-as a competent authorityhas determined that members of al Qaeda and its allies are not POWs under the GPW; and (2)
there is thus no doubt regarding their status. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 9-10
("The President has determined that members and affiliates of al Qaeda, such as petitioner, are not
covered by the Geneva Convention. That determination represents a core exercise of the
President's commander-in-chief and foreign-affairs powers during wartime and is entitled to be
given effect by the courts."). Moreover, after Hamdi and Rasul, the CSRTs were convened to
review the detainees' identifications as combatants, thus allegedly satisfying any requirement for
determinations by "tribunal" or by a "legal authority," other than the Executive himself.
However, ARMY REG. 190-8, § 1-6, requires provisional POW status for those about whose status
there is doubt or who assert they deserve POW status, which suggests that provisional POW status
might be required regardless of the government's assertions about the sufficiency of the
President's or the CSRT's determinations

of the detainees'

status.

However, it seems

unpersuasive to say that this statute and regulation render the GPW enforceable itself or in its
entirety, rather than selectively rendering the substance of the GPW enforceable under this statute
and regulation.
153. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2794 (footnote omitted).
154. See id. at 2794 nn.57-58.
155. See id. at 2794.
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Stevens reasoned, because "regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on Hamdan they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of
the law of war."15' 6 The Court found this indisputable fact about the
GPW dispositive because, regardless of self-execution, the law of war is
a component of the statutory guidelines with which the commissions
must comply. 57 "[Clompliance with the law of war is the condition
upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted."' 5 8
b.

The GPW's Particular Applicability to the U.S. War
with al Qaeda

Even if the GPW must be applied to military commissions generally, it remains unclear whether the terms of those conventions specifically reach Hamdan and other detainees in the War on Terror. The
Government and the Court of Appeals concluded that, as a matter separate from the question of general enforceability, enemy combatants in
such a war are not within the scope of persons granted protection by the
59
GPW.1
Articles 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the GPW concern conflicts
among parties who have signed the Convention, and the protections due
detained POWs.' 6 0 Article 3 establishes a much more minimal set 16
of
protections for detainees in conflicts involving only one signing party. 1
All of these Articles are only positively incumbent upon signing parties,
although the GPW provides incentives for all political communities to
adhere to the GPW's provisions whether or not they are signatories or
62
nation-states. 1
The government of Afghanistan signed the GPW.16 3 Al Qaeda has
64
not.'
The U.S. government contended, and the Court of Appeals
accepted, that the war between the United States and the Taliban is distinct from the war between the United States and al Qaeda; that Hamdan
was an enemy combatant for al Qaeda but not for the Taliban; and, con156. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
157. As Hamdan's counsel puts it:
10 U.S.C. § 821 ordains that, at most, the jurisdiction of the commissions would be
defined by the law of war. This jurisdictional limitation is the defining feature of
military tribunals and the most important protection against the threat to liberty and
our constitutional separation of powers posed by the existence of military trials.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 28 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127
(1866)).
158. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794.
159. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
160. Geneva Convention, supra note 17, arts. 2, 12-16.
161. Id. art. 3.
162. See id. art. 2.
163. See id. (listing Afghanistan as a signatory).
164. See id. (not listing al Qaeda as a signatory).
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sequently, that Article 2 does not protect Hamdan. 165
The Supreme Court declined to rule whether the wars with al
Qaeda and the Taliban are separable,1 66 and whether alleged Taliban/al
Qaeda combatants are excluded from the protections of Article 2. The
Court could do so because it concluded that Article
3 indeed applies to
67
all alleged al Qaeda and Taliban combatants.
Article 3 states that, in the case of violent political conflict-"not of
an internationalcharacter"-involvinga single signing state, the GPW
still applies, setting what it deems "a minimum" standard for the treatment of enemy combatants. 1 68 Under Article 3:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibitedat any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indis1 69
pensable by civilized peoples.
The government contended that the United States' truly global war with
165. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
166. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-95 (2006).
167. Id. at 2795. After Hamdan claimed that he should be granted POW status under Article 2,
the D.C. Court of Appeals responded that Hamdan could raise his claim of POW status, and his
challenge to the jurisdiction and process of the commission, in his trial by the commission.
Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40-41. Hamdan's counsel, in petitioning the high court, contended that
[t]he panel . . . reached the extraordinary conclusion that Hamdan could raise his
POW status claim in his commission. This acknowledges that "doubt" concerning
Hamdan's status exists, and such doubt precludes a commission trial in the first
place. It would condone an unprecedented procedural laxity, including a 4-year
delay, in implementing a solemn treaty obligation. . . . [Hamdan's] status
determination cannot take place in a tribunal trying him for war crimes.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 47 n.38.
168. Geneva Convention, supra note 17, art. 3 (emphasis added).
169. Id. (emphasis added).
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al Qaeda surely does not qualify as "not of an international nature," and
as such al Qaeda combatants are not protected by Article 3.17°
Hamdan's counsel, though, reiterated Judge Williams's opinion from the
Court of Appeals that "international" properly means "between nations,"
and that "not international" thus includes the U.S. war with al Qaeda. 7
This reading is persuasive insofar as the intent behind Article 3 was to
provide protection specifically for decolonization, revolutions, and other
rebellions. The Court further compared Article 2's provisions regarding
wars between signatory and nonsignatory nation-states occurring within
the territoryof the signatory with Article 3's provisions on "not international" conflict, concluded the following:
The term "conflict not of an international character" is used here in
contradistinction to a conflict between nations .... [C]onflict [under
Article 3] is distinguishable from the conflict [between a signatory
and nonsignatory Power] described in... Article 2 chiefly because it
does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or
not). 172
In his dissent, Justice Thomas-in accord with the Department of Justice-reasoned that the U.S. war with al Qaeda is in fact international in
nature, and thus exempt from Article 3.173 This is so, Thomas reasoned,
because the executive branch negotiates and enforces treaties like the
GPW, and therefore the Court should not lightly contradict its interpretation.1 74 Thomas continued:
Our duty to defer to the President's understanding of the provision at
issue here is only heightened by the fact that he is acting pursuant to
his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and by the fact
that the subject matter of Common Article 3 calls 1for
a judgment
75
about the nature and character of an armed conflict.
Hamdan's counsel argued that, even if Article 3 is directly inapplicable
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 48.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 49.
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2795-96.
Id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
"Pursuant to [his] authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of the
United States," the President has "accept[ed] the legal conclusion of the Department
of Justice... that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to ...al Qaeda ....
"
Under this Court's precedents, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the
Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to
great weight."
The President's interpretation of Common Article 3 is reasonable and should
be sustained.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
175. Id. at 2846 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
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to the Guantdnamo detainees in the manner set forth by Thomas,
because it is either independently unenforceable or descriptively not
inclusive of the U.S. war with al Qaeda, it nonetheless applies to the war
with al Qaeda. 176 Indeed, Article 3 applies to any conflict like the government's War on Terror because it establishes the minimal standards
regarding detainees in all violent political conflict, as a matter of cus177
tomary international laws of war.
Again, the Government argued that Hamdan's claims alleging
rights of law or custom under Article 3 could be raised in the review
afforded under the DTA, and thus urged the Court to abstain from ruling
on claims under the GPW.178 Hamdan responded with the following:
[T]here are rights at the periphery of Common Article 3 that may
necessitate trial before federal review. But the simple matters of
whether the commission is a "regularly constituted court," and can
deny fundamental rights (including the right to be present, trial by an
impartial body, and trial without risk of testimony obtained by torture) are surely not among them. A commission that does not comply
with such [fundamental179 rights] violates the laws of war and is
improperly constituted.
The Court agreed. Without affirming or rejecting the interpretation
and application of customary international law advanced by Hamdan's
counsel, the Court accepted the definition of "not international" as "not
between nation-states," thus finding that "Common Article 3 . . . is
applicable here and . . . requires that Hamdan be tried by a 'regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.' ,8o
The Court likewise accepted the sources and suggestions provided
by Hamdan's counsel 81 as to what such a "regularly constituted court"
would and could not be, concluding that
"[t]he regular military courts in our system are the courts-martial
established by congressional statutes." At a minimum, a military
commission "can be 'regularly constituted' by the standards of our
military justice system only if some practical need explains devia176. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 48-49.
177. See id.
178. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 30 n.7.
179. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 50.

180. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (citing Geneva Convention, 6 U.S.T. at 3320).
181. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines a "regularly constituted" court as

one that is "established and organised in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force
in a country . . . [and] able to perform its functions independently of any other branch of the
government, especially the executive." JEAN-MARiE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW 355-56 (2005) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). This definition is quoted in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 48,
and Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797.
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tions from court-martial
practice." . . . [N]o such need has been
82
demonstrated here.'
The dissenting justices rejected the foregoing constructions of the
GPW on several grounds. Justice Thomas contended that "even if Common Article 3 were judicially enforceable and applicable to the present
conflict, [Hamdan] would not be entitled to relief [because] any claim
'
[he] has under Common Article 3 is not ripe."183
Thomas went on that
Article 3 only prohibits the passing of sentences and performance of
executions, both of which require final judgment in order for the prohibited violation to occur.' 8 4 The majority responded that this complaint
regarding ripeness amounts to a demand for abstention and is thus dispatched in the same manner as the Government's arguments regarding
comity for military proceedings. 185 The majority also noted that Article
3 does not explicitly require a detainee to wait until after sentencing to
186
complain of procedural irregularities.
The majority recognized Thomas's view that procedural irregularities, such as the exclusion of the accused from proceedings or from
access to evidence against him, should only be challenged if they have
worked prejudice against the accused, which can only be known after
the commission concludes its trial. 87 Such prejudice-in Thomas's
opinion-is in fact prohibited by the Military Orders establishing the
commission, and may be complained of to the D.C. Circuit pursuant to
88
the DTA.'
Justice Alito opined that the commissions are "regularly constituted" as required by Article 3, given that "'a regularly constituted
court' is a court that has been appointed, set up, or established in accordance with ...domestic law."' 89 Alito consequently rejected the majority's conclusion that the commissions must mirror U.S. courts-martial in
order to be "regularly constituted."' 9 ° Rather, the commissions must
merely be properly installed under U.S. law:
Insofar as [the Government] propose[s] to conduct the [Guantdnamo
commissions] according to the procedures of Military Commission
182. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2793 n.55 (majority opinion).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2848 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the commissions' rules, the Government
may not impose such bar [of the accused] or denial [of access to evidence] on Hamdan if it would
render his trial unfair, a question that is clearly within the scope of the appellate review
contemplated by regulation and statute.").
189. Id. at 2851 (Alito, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 2850-51.
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Order No. 1 and orders promulgated thereunder-and nobody has
suggested [the Government] intend[s] otherwise-then it seems that
[Hamdan's conmmission], like the hundreds of others [the Government] propose[s] to conduct, is very much regular . *...19'
Alito, like Thomas, believed that even if particular deviations from the
courts-martial procedures are improper, those particular procedures
should be rectified, rather than having the commissions rejected outright
as illegal.19 2
Nonetheless, a majority of the Court determined that "regularly
constituted" military courts in the United States are those installed pursuant to the UCMJ, which, before the MCA, required uniformity
between commissions and courts-martial and adherence to international
laws of war. 193 Thus, significantly-not only for Hamdan and the

Guantdinamo commissions, but also generally for U.S. jurisprudence on
international law's restraints upon the U.S. government, especially the
military-international law is found binding by way of domestic statutes
and regulations that refer thereto.
In finding the administration restrained, the Hamdan majority
relied neither upon the GPW itself nor legislative ratifications or executions thereof. 194 However, as with the requirement of uniformity among
military tribunals and among civil and military courts, the Court's conclusions regarding the applicability of the laws of war to U.S.
counterterrorism were based upon statutory law in the form of the
UCMJ. 91' 5 Also, like its conclusions regarding uniformity, the Court's
conclusions about the laws of war were explicitly counteracted by the
MCA's amendment of the UCMJ. 196 Thus we can see what the Court
must have known: Its occasionally contorted and consistently myopic
attention to statutory rather than constitutional law essentially solicited
Congress's amendment of the UCMJ, even though the principles of uniformity and internationalism hailed by the Court are of profound constitutional importance as a matter of due process.197 By avoiding questions
191. Id. at 2852.

192. Id. at 2852-53.
193. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000); Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 4(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 (to be codified in scattered

sections of 10 U.S.C.).
194. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808 (relying on the UCMJ).
195. See id.

196. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a); Military Commissions Act of
2006 § 4(a).
197. Again, four Justices-the majority, excluding Justice Kennedy-held separately that
conspiracy is not a war crime and as such cannot be tried before the commissions, and that the
commissions' procedures allowing the exclusion of the accused from portions of the trial are
inconsistent with regular process befitting of "civilized" nations required by Article 3 of the GPW.
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795, 2797-98. Justice Kennedy did not clearly reject these claims as
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regarding constitutional due process for alleged alien war criminals at
Guantdinamo, the Court regrettably and recklessly deferred resolution of
Mr. Hamdan's and other detainees' substantive grievances until another
day.
IV.

HAMDAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCES

In finding jurisdiction, rejecting abstention, and deeming the commissions illegitimate under domestic and international law, the Court
relied upon legislative texts: the DTA (as dubiously constructed by the
majority); 9 8 Congress's authorization of force against al Qaeda;1 99 and
the regulations of the UCMJ (which before the MCA demanded practicably uniform tribunals and adherence to international laws of war).2"'
The Court thus refused to ask and answer whether:
" Congress can bar federal review of statutory or constitutional
habeas petitions by Guantdnamo detainees;
" Congress can restrict federal jurisdiction over detainees' claims
regarding the CSRTs and commissions;
" Congress can expressly grant the executive authority to construct
commissions identical to those ruled illegal by Hamdan;
" Congress can-as it has done in the MCA-dispense with the
principles of uniformity and internationalism enshrined in the preMCA UCMJ;
" Military, as opposed to civil, courts may be used for war-crimes
trials.
To answer these questions, the Court must determine the application of
various constitutional provisions regarding war powers, structural separation of the branches, the creation of tribunals, due process, equal protection, jury trials, cruel and unusual punishment, alienage, and
extraterritoriality as related to military detentions, trials, and
punishments.
In what follows, I attempt a preliminary and perhaps prerequisite
constitutional engagement with the questions of humanitarian law posed
above. This engagement involves the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of
due process for all persons.201 Affirming and elaborating arguments by
others,2 0 2 it is my contention that, in war or other violent conflicts
the dissenting Justices did, but he declined to affirm them given the sufficiency of the majority's
other grounds for deeming the commissions fatally and illegally flawed. See id. at 2808-09
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
198. See id. at 2764-65 (majority opinion).
199. See id. at 2753-55.
200. See id. at 2790-94.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202. See, e.g., Brief of International Law and Jurisdiction Professors, supra note 23.
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involving U.S. military or intelligence forces, the Fifth Amendment
restricts the actions of governmental agents and protects the rights of all
individuals-even and perhaps especially criminal enemy aliens held
abroad-pursuant to domestic and international laws and customs comprising humanitarian law. In the same manner that the UCMJ incorporated the laws of war, the Constitution itself invokes and binds itself to
the laws of nations and wars. As such, the Fifth Amendment necessarily
incorporates international law and custom into the fundamental individual protections and foundational governmental restrictions promulgated
by our constitutional text.
There is a necessary interrelation between domestic and international-and among statutory, constitutional, conventional, and customary-humanitarian law governing war and other violent political
conflict. This is more than a historical textual incident, which could be
displaced if the incorporative internationalist language in the Constitution and the UCMJ were eradicated. Rather, the incorporative language
of those texts reflects the necessarily synthetic character of humanitarian
law, which must traverse and inflect diverse legal systems and traditions
to govern conflicts among parties that are enemy and alien to one
another. Such conflicts often seem the very antithesis of law, and necessarily involve diverse legal institutions and orientations.
Hence, I believe that an incorporative synthesis exists in the UCMJ,
the Constitution, the GPW, and other texts of humanitarian law regarding domestic and international statutes, constitutions, conventions, and
customs. Hence, too, my belief that the Fifth Amendment's defense of
all persons' life, liberty, and property from unjust governmental imposition can and must incorporate the international laws of war as the very
meaning of due process in the context of detention amid violent political
conflict, such as the U.S. war with al Qaeda. What else could due process in the midst of war be, other than the common precepts of humanitarian law?
This view of the Fifth Amendment regarding the camps, tribunals,
and commissions requires significant doctrinal justification. Precedent
regarding the application of the Constitution to aliens, especially those
abroad or in military custody, complicates-but ultimately bears outthis proposition. In what follows, I argue that Supreme Court precedent
on war demonstrates the propriety and necessity of interpreting the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and other constitutional provisions as enforceable substantive regulations of the U.S. government's
conduct in war and other violent conflicts.2 °3
203. For example, the guarantee of equal protection incorporated into the Fifth Amendment
may prohibit the administration's disadvantageous treatment of noncitizens. See, e.g., Brief for
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Thus, even if Congress authorizes the aggressive and absolutist
power claimed by the administration in the Guantdnamo camps, as it did
in the MCA, the Fifth Amendment still demands due process-namely
that demanded by humanitarian law-for all persons. Our task is to
debate and determine what, not whether, the Fifth Amendment demands
when any person is apprehended, detained, tried, or punished by the U.S.
government.
A.

The Incorporative Universality of HumanitarianLaw

Before addressing the detainees' claims under the Fifth Amendment, I should make a series of arguments regarding the nature of
humanitarian law. Such law is necessarily comprised of both domestic
and international laws of war and crime, as the GPW, the UCMJ, the
Constitution, and the Court have made clear. Humanitarian law is jurisprudentially and thus jurisdictionally universal, though it of course only
ever exists in local and particular enactments. Humanitarian law speaks
to a fundamental dimension of law and politics-violent conflict among
political communities. Thus, it necessarily transcends the particular positive enumerations or boundaries of international associations, sovereign
nation-states, etc. I mean to say that humanitarian law does-because it
must-yield terms of judgment for all violent political conflict, including present U.S. war with al Qaeda and its allies.
Despite distinctive dimensions, the policy object and methodological foundations of humanitarian law substantively should, methodologically can, and morally must reach "wars with terror" and the pleas of the
Guantdinamo detainees.
Any particular enactment of humanitarian law is dependent upon
historical contingencies and is binding only in specific circumstances.
But the legal commitment upon which such enactments rest-the ameliorationof suffering and horrorin violent conflict among political communities-transcends the positively enumerated subjects and objects of
particular humanitarian laws. To many, international and U.S. constitutional humanitarian law seems not to conceive of, let alone judge, the
U.S. war with al Qaeda. However, even if al Qaeda falls outside of the
types parties imagined by these particular instruments, the principles of
those instruments are repeatedly articulated therein as paramount over
Petitioner, supra note 39, at 21-23; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1298 (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). The Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases, U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, may extend to war crimes
tribunals. See Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
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and above their particular subjects and objects of address, and thus
surely apply as a matter of logical and linguistic necessity.
For example, though allegedly beyond the bounds of international
humanitarian law, 2° the administration has waged and defended its present war with al Qaeda through constant, if inconsistent, reference to
humanitarian law. Specifically, and deeply ironically, the administration
has referenced international treaties on interstate warfare.2 °5 Again, the
administration has declared that much, if not all, of international humanitarian law does not apply to the U.S. war with al Qaeda and its allies.2 °6
Yet the administration's grounds for decrying al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001, require reference to some form of humanitarian law.
Without such reference, there are simply no grounds upon which we
might call those attacks, or any other act of war, criminal or otherwise
unjust (except under local criminal prohibitions of violence).
When former Attorney General John Ashcroft referenced humanitarian law to decry the September 11 attacks, as I am claiming is necessary, he called specifically upon the famous rhetoric of twentiethcentury international laws of war. Echoing the Geneva Conventions, as
well as the international criminal tribunals of Nuremberg, Tokyo,
Rwanda, and Yugoslavia, Ashcroft described the attacks as "crimes of
war" and "crimes against humanity," necessitating a comprehensive,
unprecedented, and unequivocal response by U.S. forces, including the
Justice Department and the judiciary. 20 7 Testifying before the Senate
Judiciary Committee three months after the attacks, Ashcroft characterized the legal dimensions of the U.S.-al Qaeda war thus:
Since September 11, through . . . a preventative campaign of
arrest and detention of lawbreakers, America has grown strongerand safer-in the face of terrorism....
The terrorist enemy that threatens civilization today is unlike
any we have ever known. It slaughters thousands of innocents-a
crime of war and a crime against humanity....
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are at war
with an enemy who abuses individual rights as it abuses jet airliners:
as weapons with which to kill Americans....
204. See infra text and notes 148-52.
205. See infra text and notes 208-11.
206. See, e.g., Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 33 ("Indeed, as the statement quoted from
the administration of President George Bush makes clear, the U.S. will apply GPW 'whenever
hostilities occur with regularforeign armedforces.' By its terms, therefore, the policy does not
apply to a conflict with terrorists, or with irregular forces, like the Taliban, who are armed
militants that oppressed and terrorized the people of Afghanistan.").
207. See Ashcroft Statement, supra note 33.
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We have launched the largest, most comprehensive criminal
investigation in world history to identify the killers of September 11
and to prevent further terrorist attacks....
We have waged a deliberate campaign of arrest and detention to
remove suspected terrorists who violate the law from our streets.
Currently, we have brought criminal charges against 110 individuals,
of whom 60 are in federal custody....
Under Director Bob Mueller, the FBI is undergoing an historic
reorganization to put the prevention of terrorism at the center of its
law enforcement and national security efforts....
As Attorney General, it is my responsibility-at the direction of
the President-to exercise those core executive powers the Constitution so designates. The law enforcement initiatives undertaken by the
Department of Justice, those individuals we arrest, detain or seek to
interview, fall under these core executive powers. In addition, the
President'sauthority to establish war-crimes commissions arises out

of his power as Commander in Chief. For centuries, Congress has
recognized this authority and the Supreme Court has never held that
any Congress may limit it.
In accordance with over two hundred years of historical and
legal precedent, the executive branch is now exercising its core Constitutional powers in the interest of saving the lives of Americans. I
trust that Congress will respect the proper limits of Executive Branch
consultation that I am duty-bound to uphold. I trust, as well, that
Congress will respect this President's authority to wage war on terrorism and defend our nation and its citizens with all the power
vested in him by the Constitution and entrusted to him by the American people.2 °8
Ashcroft-then the federal government's chief lawyer and law enforcement officer-calls al Qaeda's attacks crimes that infringe upon individual rights. On what positive grounds were al Qaeda's acts illegal or
were its victims' rights enshrined? Ashcroft does not specify, but his
statement that al Qaeda's crimes are "of war" and "against humanity"
clearly invoke international conventions governing interstate warfare,
despite the administration's contention that such conventions do not
apply to al Qaeda. 20 9 The administration's decision to refer to international conventions and declarations after the attacks of September 11 is
thus quite surprising, given the administration's simultaneous denial of
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 9, 23-26, 37-43, 48-50.
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the reach of those very legal instruments to the U.S.-al Qaeda war. 1 0

Such a contradiction from the nation's lead attorney-charging
alleged al Qaeda combatants with a crime under an instrument that does

not simultaneously protect them-is genuinely tragic. A similar point
was made by Hamdan's counsel as well as by former Secretary of State,
" ' My point is more general: Ashcroft's necessary reliColin Powell.21
ance on (here, international) humanitarian law demonstrates the ways in
which individual pieces of humanitarian law irradiate and synthesize

other pronouncements, including domestic pronouncements, of humanitarian law even where the irradiating individual enactments (here, the
GPW) are technically inapplicable to the conflict at issue.
The appearance, agents, and implements of political violence
change dramatically over time. This point has been consistently recognized in international humanitarian law, as new conventions, declarations, and protocols are drafted to comprehend ever-changing
technological and geopolitical realities.2 12 The spirit and substance of
international laws governing interstate warfare, like that of all humanitarian law, properly adhere to the broad phenomena of political violence

rather than the particular actors (monarchies, nation-states, etc.) or
implements (hot-air balloons, land mines, etc.) described by any single
contingent effectuation of humanitarian law. The horrors of war more
than the historicalpreeminence of the bayonet, the battlefield, or the
210. The resolute condemnation of al Qaeda's acts and very existence as war crimes is also
surprising, given the administration's own means of war-tactics resulting in collateral civilian
casualties in Iraq estimated at over 100,000 in 2004. See Rob Stein, 100,000 Civilian Deaths
Estimated in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at A16.
211. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 35-36 (quoting Memorandum from Colin L.
Powell, Sec'y of State, to Counsel to the President & Assistant to the President for Nat'l Sec.
Affairs (Jan. 26, 2002)).
The [Court of Appeals] panel somehow reached the conclusion that Haidan could
be tried for a violation of the laws of war, even though it also found that the conflict
with al Qaeda was not governed by the canonical statement of the laws of war-the
GPW. But if the laws of war do not apply, there is nothing to charge ....
[A]
finding that the Geneva Conventions do not apply "undermines the President's
Military Order [establishing the Guantd.namo commissions] by removing an
important legal basis for trying the detainees before Military Commissions."
Id.
212. See, e.g., Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899; Declaration
(IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899; Declaration (IV, 1) To Prohibit, for the
Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, and Other
Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION
OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 95, 99, 309 (Dietrich Schindler & Jirf
Toman eds., 2004); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5-8, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (declaring jurisdiction over humanitarian law
issues not only or predominantly regarding nation-states, but rather regarding all collectives
capable of violent political conflict).
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nation-state, are at the heart of humanitarian law.2" 3
The function of Article 3 within the 1949 Geneva Conventions is
emblematic. The Article's bare-minimum standard for "not international" conflict and its attempt to incite states' respect for humanitarian
law beyond their positive legal obligation under the GPW are suggestive
of the universal character of humanitarian law.' 14 "Not international"
conflict as imagined in Article 3 will almost certainly involve a political
community not a party to the GPW and not a recognized sovereign state.
Article 3 nonetheless binds signing states to apply "minimum" standards
requiring equality, dignity, safety, and judicial process in a regularly
constituted court most befitting of "civiliz[ation]." 21 5 In my mind, these
standards translate into liberal civil traditions of fair hearing, due process, presumed innocence, impartial adjudication, and independent
appeal. This minimum is admirable. Here the GPW, an international
instrument, effectuates law for single states regarding their treatment of
political enemies that are not parties to the Convention, nor even recognized as states. By establishing such minimum duties, the GPW, though
chiefly a contract among signing parties, imagines the irradiating application of its animating principles beyond the several states, military
combatants, and positively stipulated obligations that are the subjects
and objects of its address.
It is inconceivable that anything less than this minimum could be
applied to the Guantdinamo detainees even if the GPW fails to positively
cover them. In Article 3-as in the introductions to the Hague, USAPOW, and Geneva Conventions-we can discern core normative principles and minimum regulatory standards of humanitarian law that transcend the GPW's-or any convention's, clause's, or common-law
precedent's-limited positive application and historically particular context. Even if we concede that the GPW does not reach detentions in the
U.S.-al Qaeda war-whether because of a particular detainee's citizenship, association, or conduct-Article 3 establishes a universal minimum under the GPW and all humanitarian law: Detaining parties and
213. For example, note the emphasis given to humanitarian law's general principle of
mitigating the horrors of war in the following convention:
[R]ecognizing that, in the extreme case of a war, it will be the duty of every Power
to diminish, so far as possible the unavoidable rigors thereof and to mitigate the fate
of prisoners of war; desirous of developing the principles which inspired the
international conventions of The Hague, in particular the Convention relative to the
laws and customs of war and the Regulations annexed thereto; [we] have decided to
conclude a Convention to that end ....

Convention Between the United States of America and Other Powers, Relating to Prisoners of
War, Introduction, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (emphasis added).
214. Geneva Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
215. Id.
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persons must treat enemy combatants humanely; without discrimination,
violence, threat, humiliation, or degradation; and with regular judicial
process."6 The GPW, like the Hague Convention's Declaration Prohibiting Launching Projectiles or Explosives from Balloons,21 7 elaborates
only particular obligations due in very particular contexts. Beyond and
before these obligations are the general normative principles of humanitarian law that animate, and are not exhausted by, specific stipulations
regarding specific sorts of conflicts among specific sorts of political
communities in specific historical contexts.
B.

The Incorporative Humanitarianismof the Fifth Amendment

Having made arguments about the universal character of humanitarian law, I will now return to the status of the Guantinamo detainees
under the U.S. Constitution. For the sake of argument, I will continue to
assume along with the Hamdan majority that the GPW does not in itself
establish rights enforceable in the federal courts on behalf of the Guantinamo detainees. Nonetheless, international humanitarian law's central
norms, such as those expressed in Article 3 of the GPW, must protect
the detainees. In Hamdan, the majority recognized that such protections
stemmed from the legislative construction of systems of military justice
requiring adherence to the laws of war, including the GPW. 218 Even
without this legislative provision, the laws of war and thus the GPW still
bind the government's treatment of the Guantinamo detainees by way of
the Fifth Amendment. Humanitarian law, comprised of domestic and
international instruments, establishes the very meaning of due process
vis-A-vis detentions and trials arising from violent conflict between
political communities.
This interpretation, in which international humanitarian law is
incorporated through the Fifth Amendment, was advanced persuasively
in an amicus brief by David D. Caron, Anne-Marie Slaughter, John H.
Barton, and Barry E. Carter in Rasul.21 9 Their brief (like the Hamdan
Court's reading of UCMJ's Article 21) displaces the argument that the
GPW does not provide individually enforceable rights.2 2 ° It must be
noted that the brief urged only that the Court exercise jurisdiction in the
Rasul case; its arguments regarding the application of the Fifth Amendment to Guantdnamo are speculative and merely suggestive. Nonethe216. Id.
217. Declaration (IV, 1) to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles
and Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature, supra note 212.
218. See 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2006).
219. Brief of International Law and Jurisdiction Professors, supra note 23, at 12-13.
220. Id. at 16.

2008] CONSTITUTION, CAMPS & HUMANITARIAN 5TH AMENDMENT

343

less, they are helpful for deliberations on the detainees' substantive
constitutional rights.
Caron and others situate their argument for jurisdiction and constitutional application within a recognition of the growing globalization of
various spheres of domestic governmental action, a fact that they argue
calls for a more expansive approach to constitutional rights and
restraints:
As the executive acts internationally in ways that are like those of
domestic criminal law enforcement, and as international issues
become more important in daily life, Constitutional freedoms may
become meaningless unless appropriate judicial restraints are
applied.22 1
They recognize, though, the Court's traditional reluctance, and at times
outright refusal, to apply the Constitution abroad:
The Court's hesitation [in applying the Constitution extraterritorially]
appears to reflect two groups of factors. The first [involves] . . .
whether the specifics of the U.S. Bill of Rights are appropriate in
areas governed by different legal traditions . . . . The second ...
reflects the separation of powers concerns about hampering the abil22
ity of the executive to operate effectively in international affairs.
Caron and others rightly note that the first category of concerns do not
apply in the cases of the Guantinamo detainees.2 23 As to the second
category, they argue that
recognizing that law can increasingly be applied in some aspects of
international relations, [courts] are narrowing the areas within which
executives have discretion and applying constitutional or human
rights standards to executives in foreign policy actions in a growing
number of contexts.22 4
The authors also argue that the globalization of conventionally domestic
governance and the willingness of courts to engage directly therewith
have been accompanied by the codification and accumulation of related
international laws and institutions:
Courts have been emboldened to take such jurisdiction [over
government action abroad] in part because of the evolution of a set of
human rights principles which are broadly accepted (and are very
similar to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights). . . . Decisions under [various] conventions are becoming
part of a global common law, a body of interpretive jurisprudence on
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

4-5.
6-7.
7-13.
7.
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human rights, frequently citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions.2 25
For Caron and others the simultaneous need for and rise of international
law suggest the propriety of developing and applying a mutually constitutive jurisprudence of constitutional and international law regarding
U.S. governmental action abroad:
The border between the portions of international affairs that remain
anarchic and those that can be ordered legally is shifting-and each
component shifted into the legally-ordered side, and then recognized
by courts as shifted, is a benefit to the international rule of law....
This increased legalization expands on the long standing principle of United States law that Constitutional procedures must be
respected in the foreign policy area.2 26
Moreover, Caron and others contend that, of this growing body of synthetic domestic-international jurisprudence, humanitarian law applicable
to the Guantdinamo camps is among the most explicit and developed:
Among the more legalized areas is the international exercise of
criminal enforcement procedures and of treatment of prisoners,
reflecting the international human rights principles discussed above
as well as international humanitarian law principles such as those
embodied in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116.27
The authors thus suggest that the U.S. Constitution should provide jurisdictional grounds for review and perhaps substantive grounds for relief
in claims arising from U.S. military action or engagements with aliens
abroad, by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
They do so by analogy to the previously recognized mutual incorporation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as regards the Bill of
Rights' application to the states and the Equal Protection Clause's application to the federal government.22 8
225. Id. at 11 ("Among the most important are the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967)[,]
entered into force for the United States September 8, 1992, subject to Declarations.").
226. Id. at 15 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
227. Id. at 16.
228. The authors suggest:
The Court has long recognized the need for flexibility in applying Constitutional
protections abroad, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277
(1990) (Kennedy, J.[,] concurring), and has used due process as its basic source of

flexibility for incorporating principles from other areas. Thus, the Court interpreted
Fourteenth Amendment due process to incorporate portions of the Bill of Rights and
to apply them to states, using its own judgment to decide which provisions of the
Bill of Rights should thus be incorporated. Similarly, when reviewing foreign
actions of the United States executive, the Court could reasonably interpret the due
process provision of the Fifth Amendment to incorporate an appropriate
combination of Bill of Rights and international human rights norms. It has already
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Thus, all detainees have a claim under the Fifth Amendment for
redress of violations of the minimum and fundamental protections of
humanitarian law. These minimum fundamentals are parallel to (which
is not to say conceptually derivative of or positively derived from) those
enumerated in Article 3 of the GPW.22 9 These minimum fundamentals
are indeed the meaning of due process in the context of detention, trial,
and punishment of suspected enemy combatants in any conflict between
political communities.
Caron and others' argument can-and should-be taken further,
given the expansive and anti-positivist nature of the Court's jurisprudence of incorporation. In the debates surrounding the applicability of
the federal Bill of Rights to states' police forces, two competing arguments in favor of application emerged. The first interpretation, often
called the fundamental rights or fundamental fairness interpretation,
suggested that states were bound to abide by principles of fundamental
fairness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but that such fairness might not conform exactly to the federal Bill of
Rights provisions regarding criminal procedure.2 3 ° This doctrine prevailed until the 1960s.2" 3 ' Under this fundamentalist approach, states
might be bound less or more than the Bill of Rights require.23 2 The
standard of due process applied to the states under this interpretation
included rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental."2'3 3 and "essential to the very concept of
justice."2'34 Exemplifying the notion that fundamental rights exceed
considered and cited the body of international human rights law in interpreting
Constitutional provisions, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (privacy
and homosexual acts); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (death
penalty and mentally-retarded offenders); Grutterv. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347
(2003) (affirmative action) (Ginsburg, J[.], concurring). . . . Even if the
international norms were not treated as self-executing in U.S. law, i.e., not directly
applicable by courts, the Court could still regard them as declaratory of fundamental
rights or as a source to use in interpretation of a due process standard in an
international context, just as it uses the Bill of Rights to interpret due process in the
domestic context. This leaves the Court a logical basis to avoid application of the
international norms in circumstances in which they might be feared to contradict
U.S. norms.
Id. at 12-13.
229. See Geneva Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
230. The first major case to declare the federal doctrine of "fundamental fairness" in state
criminal proceedings was Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), which addressed whether
the Fifth Amendment's requirement of grand juries for criminal indictments should extend,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, to the states. See id. at 534-35; see also Jerold H. Israel,
Selective Incorporation:Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 278 (1982) (discussing Hurtado).

231.
232.
233.
234.

See Israel, supra note 230, at 273.
See id. at 274-76.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:307

even the Constitution's text, the Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio235
overturned a state-court conviction because the trial judge had a personal
interest in the conviction. 23 6 The Court thus held that state criminal proceedings must provide an unbiased judge. Such a requirement, however,
is nowhere listed in the federal Bill of Rights. Thus the doctrine of
fundamental fairness, authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
inclusive of the fundamental guarantees in the Bill of Rights, exceeds
the enumerated institutional guarantees of all the relevant amendments.
Under the second approach to federalizing state policing, often called
total incorporation, the entire federal Bill of Rights was incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment as a restraint upon states' police
powers.2 3 7 This approach appeared in numerous concurring and dissenting opinions offered alongside majority opinions on fundamental fairness from the 1880s to the 1960s. 3 8 Justice Black was the chief
proponent of total incorporation,arguing that fundamentalfairness was
textually and historically inapt, as well as a judicially hubristic and arbitrary doctrine. 23 9 Black argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily drew the named federal criminal
protections down to the level of state policing. 4 ° In resolving this
debate, the Court ultimately settled on an approach called selective
incorporation. One of its first iterations was in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Hurley.2 4 1 Under this doctrine, certain of
the federal Bill of Rights's provisions, namely those deemed fundamental, are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the selective incorporationmethod also maintains that dimension
of the fundamentalfairness doctrine that allowed federal courts to bind
state police in excess of the restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights.
Under the doctrine of selective incorporation, the Court during the
1960s extended to state policing the obligations of the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments regarding: (1) unreasonable searches and
seizures,
(2) self-incrimination,2 43 (3) double jeopardy, 24 (4) legal
235. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
236. Id. at 535.
237. See Israel, supra note 230, at 257.
238. See id. at 256-73.
239. See Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. Cmu. L. REv. 215, 221 n.32
(2003) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v.
State, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 601 n.4 (1942))).
240. See id. at 222 (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting)).
241. 366 U.S. 117, 154-60 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60

(1961).
243. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
244. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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representation for the accused,24 5 (5) speedy trials,24 6 (6) jury trials,247
(7) confrontation of witnesses,24 8 (8) acquisition of witnesses,24 9 and (9)
cruel and unusual punishment.25 ° In the same era the Court also
advanced doctrines on fundamentalfairness that guaranteed extra-constitutional protections to the subjects of state policing, in the manner
performed by the Tumey case in the 1920s.2 5 Now called free-standing
due process, rulings on fundamentalfairness beyond the substance and
settings of the named protections in the Bill of Rights limited state25 2protocols for policing, pre-trial, pleas, trial, sentencing, and appeals.
Though the Rehnquist Court in many respects halted and reversed
the movement of the Warren Court,2 53 the general jurisprudential matter
remains: Principles of justice qua federal constructions of states' due
process obligations have, in the course of U.S. constitutional history,
demanded and received readings of the Revolutionary and Reconstruction Constitutions that exceed both the structural parameters (vis-A-vis
federal-state relations) and the substantive guarantees stated therein.
Such recourse to principles of selective incorporation and fundamental fairness is unsurprising, given the U.S. Constitution's entirely
abstract and expressionistic guarantee of due process and its minimalist
and provisional management of multiple sovereignty.
In the context of war and counterterrorism, a similar negotiation of
multiple sovereignty involving an incorporative synthesis of constitutional and international law is not unprecedented. The Constitution
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-20 (1967).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).

251. See Israel, supra note 230, at 281; see also Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process
and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines,45 ST. Louis.

U. L.J. 303, 379-90 (2001).
252. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 230, at 304-05.
253. Such free-standingdue process, however, was mightily restrained by rulings in the 1990s.
In Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990), and Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,

443 (1992), the Court found that in federal and state criminal proceedings, the Due Process
Clauses must reach only very narrowly and modestly beyond the protections enumerated in the
Bill of Rights. These cases and their successors established that successful appeals under a
doctrine of free-standing due process must do three things. First, it must pass an inquiry more
deferential to the government than that of traditional balancing tests used in due process doctrines.
See Medina, 505 U.S. at 446. Second, it must demonstrate not only a violation of fundamental
fairness, but also a likely prejudice to the defendant thereby. See United States v. GonzalezLopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561-63 (2006) (establishing that Bill of Rights claims require no
showing of prejudice, while free-standing due process claims must demonstrate overall unfairness
of trial). Third, it must demonstrate in some contexts that "the totality of the circumstances" in the
case-and not merely a single prohibited act-affect an affront to fundamental fairness. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
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itself of course does so by elevating treaties to constitutional status and
by recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the laws of nations.25 4
Supreme Court precedent on humanitarian law likewise engages in
this incorporation. One example, though controversial, most clearly
makes this point. In Yamashita255 (where the Court considered a Japanese general's challenge to the jurisdiction of a military commission trying him for failing to prevent war crimes by his subordinates), the
majority derived the legitimacy of the commission and the charges
against General Yamashita by reference to a synthetic incorporation of
constitutional and international humanitarian law:
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose
excesses are unrestrained ... would almost certainly result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose
to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality
would largely be defeated if the commander ... could with impunity
neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection." 6
The Court speaks to the "law of war" and its primary end of minimizing
and ameliorating brutality in violent political conflict, and, at the same
time, the Court hails the specific language of international humanitarian
law regarding POWs and civilian populations from prior conventions on
war among states.2 57 Three years before the 1949 Geneva Convention,
the Supreme Court had incorporated contemporary international humanitarian law into and through U.S. constitutional interpretation. The
Court concluded that
[t]he trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have committed
violations of the law of war is thus not only a part of the conduct of
war operating as a preventive measure against such violations, but is
an exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress to administer the
system of military justice recognized by the law of war. 8
Thus, the Court notes that the Constitution's grant to Congress of the
authority to create such commissions is derived from and in dialogue
with international humanitarian law. In other words, Hamdan often
emphasizes, and thus presumably grants deference to, the enumerated
power of Congress to establish military commissions or authorize the
254. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, 11 (granting Congress authority "[t]o define and punish
...Offences against the Law of Nations; ... and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water"); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
255. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).

256. Id. at 15.
257. Id. at 15-16; see also Convention Between the United States of America and Other
Powers, Relating to Prisoners of War, Introduction, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S.
343 (using similar language and predating Yamashita).
258. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11.
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President to do so or both.2 9 This enumerated power, in our own precedents, is derived from and in dialogue with the law of war, which ordinarily in such context means international treaties and protocols signed
among nation-state governments. The Yamashita majority's rhetorical
harmony with extant and impending international humanitarian laws
supports this understanding of the "law of war," which Congress is constitutionally empowered to implement.2 6 °
Moreover, humanitarian law's constitutional norm against brutality
leads the Court to establish a law regarding commanders' responsibility
for subordinates' war crimes-a law not positively enumerated by then
existing "laws of war.",261 Thus, the Court's interpretive justification of
the charges against Yamashita demonstrates what I argue: Universal
norms of humanitarian law-e.g., those prohibiting brutality, discrimination, degradation, threat, and disappearance-are to be applied to violent political conflicts even if the particular subjects or objects of such
application are not positively enumerated in a binding and enforceable
legal instrument.
Justice Murphy dissented in Yamashita, asserting (among other
things) that any such military tribunal must comport with the standards
of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, irrespective of such
tribunals' legislative and executive authorization, irrespective of their
adherence to and advancement of "the laws of war" otherwise. 262 By
Murphy's reading, due process properly applies to "any person"including non-citizens-whose life or liberty is threatened by any governmental official or agency. 26 3 As such, charges of war crimes, some
punishable by death, must necessarily bear the protections of full criminal due process. I quote Justice Murphy at length because his argument
has indeed become the dominant tenet of contemporary humanitarian
law:
The authority for [the present] action grows out of the exercise of the
power conferred upon Congress by . . .the Constitution to "define
and punish ...Offenses against the Law of Nations ... ." The grave
issue raised by this case is whether a military commission so established and so authorized may disregard the procedural rights of an
259. See 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2803 (2006) (Breyer, J., Concurring).
260. See 327 U.S. at 13-15.
261. Such rules regarding command responsibility for war crimes were not clearly codified
until Article 86 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 86, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; see also Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Command Responsibility, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNow (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).
262. See 327 U.S. at 25-29 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 25.
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accused person as guaranteed by the Constitution, especially by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The answer is plain. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due
process of law applies to "any person" who is accused of a crime by
the Federal Government or any of its agencies. No exception is made
as to those who are accused of war crimes or as to those who possess
the status of an enemy belligerent. Indeed, such an exception would
be contrary to the whole philosophy of human rights which makes the
Constitution the great living document that it is. The immutable
rights of the individual, including those secured by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to the members of
those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the
democratic ideology. They belong to every person in the world,
victor or vanquished, whatever may be his race, color, or beliefs.
They rise above any status of belligerency or outlawry. They survive
any popular passion or frenzy of the moment. No court or legislature
or executive, not even the mightiest army in the world, can ever
destroy them. Such is the universal and indestructible nature of the
rights which the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment recognizes and protects when life or liberty is threatened by virtue of the
authority of the United States. 6 4

Justice Rutledge likewise urged the application of constitutional criminal due process requirements to military tribunals (even if explicitly congressionally authorized) charging any person (even aliens) with any
crime (including war crimes).2 65 Rutledge's opinion, in part, also has
become the law and custom of war:
It is not too early, it is never too early, for the nation steadfastly to
follow its great constitutional traditions, none older or more universally protective against unbridled power than due process of law in
the trial and punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether citizens,
aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents. It can become too
late ....
...

[Our philosophy] is one of universal law, albeit imperfectly

made flesh of our system and so dwelling among US.266
These dissenting opinions, like the overriding of Yamashita worked by
the codification of the UCMJ, 2 67 demonstrate an important debate and
development in humanitarian law. The dissenters argue that there are
constitutional limits on the U.S. government's defense of the international laws of war. The limits they urge-regular judicial process under
264. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
265. See id. at 68-81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 41-42.
267. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2789 (2006) (discussing the outdatedness of
Yamashita in light of the UCMJ and developments in international law).
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the Fifth Amendment-have subsequently become articulated as a part
of the international laws of war. As I will discuss shortly, developments
in international and domestic humanitarian law have come to require full
and fair process for all suspected war criminals and alleged enemy combatants. As such, the method engaged by the Yamashita majority now
urges the dissenters' conclusions regarding due process.
Agreeing with the dissents from Yamashita,26 8 I mean to propose
answers to the constitutional questions unasked and unanswered by the
Court in Hamdan.2 69 The questions, collapsed into a single reductive
hypothesis, may be put thus: Presuming adequate and explicit congressional authorization, would the Guantdnamo detainees' treatment in the
camps, tribunals, and commissions be constitutionally sufficient under
the Fifth Amendment?
No.
Confronted with changing and far more explicit domestic and international humanitarian laws regarding detentions and crimes of war, the
deferent and insubstantial due process of the Guantdinamo commissions
(as well as those tribunals at issue in Quirin27 and Yamashita27 1) must
be forbidden by a reading of the Fifth Amendment that-as Quirin and
Yamashita require-draws upon contemporary laws and customs of
domestic and international humanitarian law in order to determine the
proper judicial process due to suspected combatants and war criminals
under the U.S. Constitution.
Developments in domestic and international humanitarian law
272
affirm the dissents from Yamashita by Justices Rutledge and Murphy.
These developments echo the Yamashita dissents 273 and assert that war
crime, like all crime, is a serious charge that must be proven individually
amid the procedures and protections due to defendants in regular courts,
which in the U.S. context means either federal criminal courts or military courts-martial.
The international custom and law (for many) regarding due process
in trials for war crimes are clear. Affirming and updating the GPW, an
international community of states signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, clearly defining violations of humanitarian law
and permanently establishing the International Criminal Court as a neutral, multinational institution possessed of a complex, synthetic criminal
268. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26-41 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 41-81 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
269. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
270. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
271. 327 U.S. 1.
272. Id. at 26-41 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 41-81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
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jurisprudence derived from its founding statute, international law, and
the laws of the several states.274 The Rome Statute guarantees a robust
due process.2 75 As a result of a melding of common- and civil-law traditions,2 76 the due process established by the Rome Statute does not
include the U.S. criminal due process right to a jury trial.2 77 This exclusion parallels custom in U.S. military courts.27 8
The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court ("ICC")
expand and more explicitly articulate the emphatic but inconclusive due
process provisions of the GPW.279 In suggesting that the universal
norms of humanitarian law should guide the Court's adjudication, the
Yamashita majority implies that present international law and custom
ought to bear on the determination of proper due process for enemy
combatants under the U.S. Constitution.2 8 °
The Clinton administration voted against the Rome Treaty in 1998,
and subsequently refused to sign it; however, near the end of his second
term, on December 31, 2000, President Clinton did sign the treaty, but
urged his successor not to submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
President Bush went further, nullifying Clinton's signature in 2002, and
advancing fierce legislative and diplomatic measures to undermine the
legitimacy and stunt the functional capacities of the ICC.2 81 Nonetheless, the international humanitarian law and custom detailed in the Rome
Statute must affect our own sense, under our own Constitution, of the
rights and process due to suspected combatants and war criminals.
Thus, if the U.S. government never signs the Rome Statute, and if our
Congress specifically implements military tribunals to charge and try
war crimes, such tribunals must be possessed of due process reflecting,
if not participating in, international law and custom, including those of
the International Criminal Court.2 82
274. See Rome Statute, supra note 212.
275. See id.
276. See Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001
(referring to the "blend[ing of] civil and common law traditions").
277. See id.; Human Rights Watch, Myths and Facts About the InternationalCriminal Court,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/facts.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2007).
278. See The InternationalCriminal Court: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on International
Relations, 106th Cong. 94 (2000) (statement of Monroe Leigh on behalf of the American Bar
Association); Roth, supra note 276.
279. See Rome Statute, supra note 212, arts. 17(2), 20(3)(b).
280. 327 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1946).
281. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat.
899 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-743 1); see also United Nations Association of the

United States of America, Comparison of the Clinton and Bush Administration Positions on the
International Criminal Court, http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=345925
(last visited Dec. 16, 2007).
282. See Rome Statute, supra note 212.
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U.S. law since Yamashita has likewise established procedures and
protections for persons accused of war crimes. In refusing to sign the
Rome Statute, the U.S. executive and legislature instituted the War
Crimes Act of 1996 ("WCA").2 83 This act follows the GPW in defining
war crimes in detail.2 84
Regardless of citizenship, victims or perpetrators of violations of
humanitarian law2 85 by or against U.S. citizens or soldiers must be given
the protections of the Fifth Amendment. These protections include the
right to appellate review beyond the branch that set the terms of detention and trial. As such, international humanitarian law and custom have

been codified in the U.S. Code in the form of the WCA.
Thus, international and domestic law and custom suggest that the
Fifth Amendment's due process requirements for trials of war crimes
must closely parallel U.S. criminal due process. At the very least, trials
of war crimes must mirror the process of U.S. courts-martial. The
88
2 87
28 6
precedents established in The Insular Cases, Hamdi, and RasuP2
283. Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
284. The War Crimes Act reads:
(a) Offense. Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a
war crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death
results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.
(b) Circumstances. The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the
person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of
the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.S. § 1101]).
(c) Definition. As used in this section the term "war crime" means any
conduct(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at
Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United
States is a party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18
October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in
subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed
conflict not of an international character; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the
provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II
as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol,
willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians.
Id.
285. Humanitarian law as described generally in the Geneva Convention, supra note 17.
286. See infra note 289.
287. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
288. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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support the argument that such incorporative procedures and protections
are proper under the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The constitutional questions raised by the detention, trial, and punishment of persons in the U.S.-al Qaeda war are fundamental. Thus,
even under The Insular Cases from the beginning of the twentieth century, in which the Constitution's application to foreign lands and bodies
was often limited to culturally and contextually appropriate fundamental
rights, 8 9 humanitarian law establishes that due process akin to federal
criminal or courts-martial proceedings is the appropriate, customary, and
practicable process due to alien detainees.
The Insular Cases, in sum, suggest that constitutional due process
may be inapt, unworkable, or otherwise unavailable in international contexts where local custom or pragmatic concern outweigh the claim to or
interest in such process. Thus, claims of a constitutional right to jury
trials2 9 ° and revenue provisions2 9' in Puerto Rico, grand juries2 92 and
jury trials2 93 in the Philippines, and grand juries and jury trials in
Hawaii 94 were all examined by the Court to determine whether the normative ideal or material realization of such rights would be improper or
impracticable. In the case of detention, trial, and punishment arising
from violent political conflict, it is customary to have something quite
close, if not identical to, federal criminal due process. At the very least,
the process of courts-martial is certain. Because a consideration of local
custom and logistical practicability might eschew constitutional rights
under The Insular Cases, it would ultimately require reference to international and domestic humanitarian law and thus recommend a very
close parallel to criminal or courts-martial procedures.
The Verdugo-Urquidez case rejected the contextual doctrines of
The Insular Cases and denied the application of Constitutional rights to
aliens abroad.2 95 Recent holdings regarding the Guantdinamo camps,
however, suggest that the starkest interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez
289. In Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891), the Court said that "[t]he Constitution can
have no operation in another country." The Insular Cases began ten years later. They include
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). In these cases, the
Court progressively expanded the reach of the Constitution. The split among the plurality at the
Insular era's end was only as to how many, and in what context, constitutional rights applied to
citizens and aliens in U.S. territories or abroad claiming injury at the hands of the U.S.
government. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 41-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); id. at 78-90 (Clark, J., dissenting).
290. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 303-04.
291. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
292. See Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914).
293. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 139.
294. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211 (1903).
295. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) ("Indeed we have
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may no longer be good law, especially given that case's far more conservative concurrence by Justice Kennedy, which partly maintained the
model of The Insular Cases.2 96
The Court in Hamdi does not discuss suspected war criminals, but
rather it discusses alleged enemy combatants. 297 Additionally, Hamdi
addresses only Guantdinamo detainees who are also U.S. citizens.2 9 8 It is
thus largely distinguishable from Hamdan. Hamdi, though, is instructive in its Fifth Amendment analysis regarding due process for all Guan299
tdnamo detainees in terms of all identifications, detentions, and trials.
Despite recognizing the legitimacy of some of the government's
detentions, 3" O'Connor wrote for the Hamdi majority that "[e]ven in
cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized,
there remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a
citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status. ' 3 °1
After dismissing the administration's claim that Hamdi conceded
his enemy status,3 °2 O'Connor then examines whether providing federal

judicial scrutiny of, or more rigorous due process duties within, the government's identification of combatants would be as unconstitutional and
unworkable as the Bush administration claims:
rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the territory of the
United States.").
296. Id. at 275-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) ("[W]e are called upon to consider the legality of the
Government's detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an 'enemy
combatant."').
298. Id.
299. See id. at 524-37.
300. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, held that in passing the Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Congress authorized the detention of combatants such as Hamdi. Hamdi, 542 U.S.
at 518. The holding here is exceedingly and intentionally narrow. The plurality in Hamdi
concedes only that the AUMF amounts to a congressional authorization of the detention of enemy
combatants "'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners'" in
Afghanistan and who "'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States"' there. Id. at 526
(citing Brief for Respondents, supra note 2, at 3).
301. Id. at 524.
302. In dismissing this claim, Justice O'Connor writes:
Hamdi's seizure cannot in any way be characterized as "undisputed," as "those
circumstances are neither conceded in fact, nor susceptible to concession in law,
because Hamdi has not been permitted to speak for himself or even through counsel
as to those circumstances." Further, the "facts" that constitute the alleged
concession are insufficient to support Hamdi's detention.... An assertion that one
resided in a country in which combat operations are taking place is not a concession
that one was "captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign theater of
war," and certainly is not a concession that one was "part of or supporting forces
hostile to the United States or coalition partners" and "engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States." Accordingly, we reject any argument that Hamdi has
made concessions that eliminate any right to further process.
Id. at 526-27 (citations omitted).
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Under the Government's most extreme rendition ..."[r]espect for
separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of
courts in matters of military decision-making in connection with an
ongoing conflict" ought to eliminate entirely any individual process,
restricting the courts to investigating only whether legal authorization
exists for the broader detention scheme. At most, the Government
argues, courts should review its determination that a citizen is an
enemy combatant under a very deferential "some evidence" standard.3 ° 3 Under this review, a court would assume the accuracy of the
Government's articulated basis for Hamdi's detention ... and assess

only whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one ....
In response, Hamdi emphasizes that this Court consistently has recognized that an individual challenging his detention may not be held
at the will of the Executive without recourse to some proceeding
before a neutral tribunal to determine whether the Executive's
asserted justifications for that detention have basis in fact and warrant
in law. He argues that the Fourth Circuit inappropriately "ceded
power to the Executive during wartime to define the conduct for
which a citizen may be detained, judge whether that citizen has
engaged in the proscribed conduct, and imprison that citizen indefinitely," and that due process demands that he receive a hearing in
which he may ...

adduce his own counter evidence. 3°

Applying the test from Mathews v. Eldridge,3" 5 O'Connor began the
process of "weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the
official action' against the Government's asserted interest, 'including the
function involved' and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process."30 6

O'Connor concluded that formal tribunal

proceedings over, and federal judicial review of, citizen detainees' identification as combatants was proper due process given the liberty interests at issue.30 7 The imposition of such proceedings on the Bush
administration and its military forces did not override detained citizens'
liberty interests:
303. The Hamdi Court cited to Superintendent,Mass. Corr.Inst. v. Hill, 427 U.S. 445, 455-57
(1985), which held that "[u]nder the some evidence standard, the focus is exclusively on the

factual basis supplied by the Executive to support its own determination." Id. at 527 (noting that
the some evidence standard "does not require" a "weighing of the evidence," but calls for

assessing "whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion").
304. Id. at 527-28 (citations omitted).
305. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

306. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). O'Connor further states that
[t]he ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing
interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a

citizen is not "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," is
the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge ....

Id. at 528-29 (citation omitted).
307. See id. at 530-31.
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"[it is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection" .....
Indeed, as amicus briefs from media and relief organizations emphasize, the risk of erroneous deprivation of a citizen's liberty in the
absence of sufficient process here is very real. Moreover, as critical
as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually
pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States
during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense
teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat. Because we live in a society in which "[m]ere
public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person's physical liberty," our starting point for the
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis is unaltered by the allegations surrounding the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is
alleged to have associated. We reaffirm today the fundamental
nature of a citizen's right to be free from involuntary confinement by
his own government without due process of law, and we weigh the
opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty
that such confinement entails.3 8
The due process interest that O'Connor defends under the HamdiMathews analysis must be examined with consideration given to humanitarian law (including its international iterations) under Quirin3 9 and
Yamashita.3 1 ° This collectively suggests that such process must be
robust and liberal; it must be similar to the process due to criminal
defendants under the Fifth Amendment, or at least similar to courts-martial defendants under the UCMJ.3 1

The interests discussed by O'Connor, despite the consistent and
quite explicit limitation of her holding to citizen detainees, transcend
any distinction between aliens and citizens. The administration's interests remain the same, unless it claims a greater, and thus discriminatory,
interest in combatants and war criminals from nations other than the
United States. Moreover, humanitarian law attests that the proper due
process for persons deemed combatants in violent conflict between
political communities should not hinge upon their status as aliens.
Humanitarian law, at its core, seeks to establish and advance fundamental norms and minimum standards to ameliorate the brutality and injustice that so often accompany violent political enmity and distinction
among states, nations, or nationalities.
This nondiscriminatory, universal aim of humanitarian law is sup308. Id. (citations omitted).
309. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
310. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
311. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
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ported by Rasul, wherein the Court summarily rebuffed the administration's argument that aliens possess no right to petition for habeas corpus
in the federal courts when detained in the U.S.-al Qaeda war.3" 2 As
Professor Katyal notes:
This holding [in Rasul] is potentially unbounded, perhaps enabling
someone detained at Kandahar or even Diego Garcia to challenge his
detention via the great writ. It appears to be a striking break from the
1950 Johnson v. Eisentragerdecision, which strongly intimated that
no such lawsuits were possible . . . [because] no alien outside of the
United States could challenge his detention .... 313
Moreover, Katyal contends that "[t]he [Rasul] majority refused to cabin
its holding to nonmilitary tribunal detainees or to those only at Guantanamo. And the justices may have tipped their hands about.. . the extra3 14
territorial application of the Constitution to the detainees.
The Rasul Court determined that the Guantdnamo camps are not
"outside" the United States because they are on territory entirely under
the control of the U.S. military. 315 Similarly, the detainees in Rasul had
received neither military nor civil judicial process,3 16 while the detainees
in Eisentragerhad already had a military trial, and were petitioning after
its conclusion.3 17 It was upon those far more reserved grounds that Justice Kennedy concurred with the Rasul majority, writing separately just
as he had done in Hamdan.3 1 8
The Rasul majority, however, does not rely on the points of distinction from Eisentrager. Rather, it is argued that "Rasul eviscerates
[Eisentrager], leading Justice Scalia in his dissent to lament that
'[t]oday's opinion. . . overrules Eisentrager.' " 3 19 Thus, "the Court may
have cut back on an argument the executive branch has held in its back
pocket for many years . . . [by suggesting] that certain fundamental
rights may apply abroad. 32 °
312. See 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
313. Katyal, supra note 8, at 49 (citation omitted).
314. Id. at 55.
315. See 542 U.S. at 484.
316. See id. at 471-72.
317. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950).
318. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy distinguished
the circumstances of Rasul from Eisentragerin two ways: first, by observing that Guantdnamo is
in "every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far removed from any
hostilities[," and second, by observing that "the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held
indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding to determine their status. In Eisentrager,
the prisoners were tried and convicted by a military commission of violating the laws of war and
were sentenced to prison terms." Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487-88; see also Katyal, supra note 8, at
53-54 (discussing Kennedy's concurrence).
319. Katyal, supra note 8, at 50-51 (quoting Rasul, 542 U.S. at 497 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
320. Id. 54-55.
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Indeed, the Rasul majority emphasizes the seriousness of the
detainees' allegations regarding deprivations of liberty and affirms a line
of precedent establishing Fifth Amendment rights for aliens outside the
U.S. 32 ' With reference to Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez
"and cases cited therein[," 32' 2 which collectively affirm at least some
extraterritorial fundamental rights for non-citizens, the Court suggests
that it is willing to recognize Fifth Amendment rights for all Guantinamo detainees, or indeed for any alien detainee held by the Bush
administration in the Guantinamo camps or anywhere else in the
world.32 3
Nonetheless, Rasul, like Hamdan, is decided upon statutory, not
constitutional grounds regarding rights to federal review.32 4 Thus, the
Constitution is not necessarily the sole ground upon which Guantdinamo
detainees may assert their rights under the great writ guaranteed by
Rasul.325 But this says nothing of the Constitution's sufficiency as
grounds for relief rather than review. The government in Rasul and elsewhere alleged that there are no substantive grounds upon which to give
the detainees relief, even if there is a right to habeas review.3 26 Hamdan
finds substantive grounds to relieve the detainees, thereby demanding
the reconstruction of the Guantdinamo commissions. However, Hamdan
relies upon statutory grounds in doing so, referencing the Congress's
ambiguous DTA, its minimal AUMF, and its regulations in the UCMJ.
The implications of Rasul and Hamdan regarding constitutional
rights for non-citizens detained by the military are of great importance.
Rasul's implications are not realized in Hamdan, though they are surely
not foreclosed either. Indeed, they seem nearly inevitable, which is why
it is so disappointing that the Court failed to explicitly avow the Fifth
Amendment, rather than the UCMJ, as the means by which fundamental
minimums of humanitarian law govern the Guantdnamo camps.
Some, however, including the Bush administration in In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases,3 27 have argued that the Fifth Amendment yields
no substantive ground upon which to demand constitutional due process
in executive military detentions of aliens abroad, irrespective of
3 28
Rasul.
321. See 542 U.S. at 484.
322. Id. at 484 n.15.
323. See id.
324. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2764-67, 2775-77, 2790-93 (2006); Rasul,
542 U.S. at 478.
325. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478.
326. See id. at 478-79.
327. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
328. See id. at 464.
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I disagree. Apart from the obvious violation of equal protection
resulting from such an irrational, if not xenophobic, regime delimited by
citizenship,32 9 just as Rasul accompanied Hamdi's recognition of the
right of citizen-detainees to petition for habeas corpus, so too must the
Fifth Amendment process due to citizen-detainees extend identically to
aliens.
Recall the Verdugo-Urquidez case,3 3 ° in which a majority seemed
to reject the contextual doctrines of The Insular Cases and deny the
application of constitutional rights to aliens abroad. This case was cen33 1
tral to the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in the predecessor of Rasul.
The D.C. Circuit held that aliens not in a U.S. territory have no right to a
habeas petition, and no substantive constitutional rights at all.33 2 The
Supreme Court overruled the D.C. Circuit in Rasul as to the habeas petition, but did not expressly outline the constitutional rights of alien
detainees.33 3 However, as Judge Green notes in In re Guantanamo
Detainees Cases, the D.C. Circuit had held that the right to a habeas
334
petition was directly tied to a substantive constitutional right to relief.
The D.C. Circuit held, under Eisentrager, that alien detainees had no
right to a habeas petition.3 35 The Supreme Court in Rasul disagreed,
declaring Eisentrager inapplicable to Guantdnamo detainees.3 36 As
such, per Judge Green's detailed analysis, the contextual fundamentalrights analysis of The Insular Cases was reestablished in Rasul. As
Judge Green thoughtfully notes:
[R]ather than citing Eisentrager or even the portion of VerdugoUrquidez that referenced the "emphatic" inapplicability of the Fifth
Amendment to aliens outside U.S. territory, the Rasul Court specifically referenced the portion of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
in Verdugo-Urquidez that discussed the continuing validity of the
Insular Cases, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert,
and Justice Kennedy's own consideration of whether requiring adherence to constitutional rights outside
of the United States would be
337
"impracticable and anomalous."
Hence, according to Judge Green, the Rasul majority concludes that
"[p]etitioners' allegations.., unquestionably describe custody in viola329. See Neal K. Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59

STAN.

(2007).
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

494 U.S. 259 (1990).
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
See id. at 1141-45.
See 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
See 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (D.D.C. 2005).
See id. at 459.
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484-85,
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463.

L. Rav. 1365, 1381-93
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tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."3'38
Judge Green thus reads Rasul, The Insular Cases, and other precedents
to suggest that constitutional rights may apply to aliens abroad under
U.S. custody, so long as doing so is neither impracticable nor anomalous. 3 3 9 The question then becomes what process would pass this standard. The "law of war," which as I've argued, must comprise due
process in the case of the Guantinamo detainees, is in fact the source of
Congress's and the President's constitutional authority over such detentions and trials. The D.C. Circuit Court held that with regard to the
UCMJ's courts-martial proceedings, it would be neither impracticable
nor anomalous to apply fundamental norms of international humanitarian law, incorporated in and through the Fifth Amendment, to all persons detained by the U.S. government.34 ° Thus, Rasul and In re
Guantanamo Detainees support the view that the Fifth Amendment provides substantive grounds for review and relief for any detainee deprived
constitutional due process by the U.S. government or military.
In sum, my adoption and elaboration of Caron and others' argument regarding the Fifth Amendment's incorporation of humanitarian
law and custom, and of Judge Green's reading of Rasul, suggest that the
Guantdinamo commissions and tribunals must be based on humanitarian
law, which requires adherence to the minimal standards of the GPW's
Article 3, including due process closely parallel, if not identical, to that
of U.S. criminal law or courts-martial.3 4 1 This would include individual
criminal charges, full and fair evidentiary hearing of all charges and
defenses, and a right to external appellate review.34 2 This fundamental
right to decent treatment and due process must be granted all detainees,
whether citizen or alien, with regard to their identification, detention,
treatment, trial, and punishment as combatants or war criminals.
V.

CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POSITIVISM
343
IN HUMANITARIAN LAW

Irrespective of whether any particular instrument, such as the GPW,
338. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
339. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
340. See id. 478-81. Judge Green thus held that the Bush administration's Combatant Status
Review Tribunals, created after Hamdi and Rasul, were unconstitutional. See id. at 481. As such,
Judge Green held that detainees must have access to review by the federal courts, with
constitutional due process. See id. at 463. Moreover, Judge Green held that Taliban combatants
may rightly invoke the protections of the Geneva Convention, which she held was self-executing,
according to relevant law and custom. See id. at 478-79 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2004)).
341. See Geneva Convention, supra note 17.
342. See id.

343. The remarks in this conclusion clearly have much in common with the contrast drawn by
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positively governs the Bush administration's treatment of the Guantinamo detainees, humanitarian law necessarily does. From this conclusion, we must consult the GPW and other sources for foundational
principles and minimum standards regarding the duties and rights due to
suspected combatants and war criminals under humanitarian law. From
this vantage, the principles of humanitarian law are principles of U.S.
constitutional law and of due process under the Fifth Amendment specifically. As such, the general principles and minimum standards articulated in the Geneva Convention's Common Article 3,3 4 for example,
must be identified and applied to the U.S.-al Qaeda war through concerted reference to domestic and international precedents* and proceedings to identify what process is due to al Qaeda and aligned combatants
under the U.S. Constitution. In this case, again, the question of whether
the GPW itself establishes self-executing grounds for individual detainees' claims against the Bush administration becomes irrelevant.
And so, whether construed as a claim under a self-executing
Geneva Convention, under the UCMJ, 34 5 which recognizes the "law of
war," or under a properly contextual and nondiscriminatory Due Process
Clause, humanitarian law protects the Guantinamo detainees. At no
point may the government compromise, by will or neglect, the minimum
standards or fundamental norms of humanitarian law that are embodied
in the individual instruments thereof, such as those of the Geneva Convention requiring regular and civilized due process and prohibiting brutality, degradation, discrimination, humiliation, threat, and
disappearance.3 46
Every alleged violation of these minimum standards and fundamental norms, and indeed every prayer for relief under humanitarian law,
will require individual factual judgment of particular acts and evidence
through interpretive application of both positive legal obligations and
universal norms animating those obligations. This is how, in the case of
humanitarian law governing the transhistorical, cross-cultural problem
of political violence, constitutionalism necessarily works through but
exceeds positivism. This is how the laws of war necessarily apply to the
War on Terror. This is why we-Attorney General Ashcroft and his
successors, the Supreme Court, and I-can, do, and must speak of even
unprecedented wars with reference to the universal principles and particRonald Dworkin between his own jurisprudential theory of interpretivism and the positivism of
H.L.A. Hart (among others). Compare RONALD DwoRIrN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), with H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

(1961).

344. See Geneva Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
345. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
346. See Geneva Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
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ular instruments of humanitarian law, including those that are allegedly
inapplicable and anachronistic.
In interpretive translation, we apply foundational norms and minimum standards to do what we must in advancing and defending the
long-suffering attempt, through law, to at least minimize, if not eradicate, the horror, cruelty, violence, and damage of violent political conflict. Doing so requires, and has always required, that we advance
humanitarian law through international and domestic doctrines of war
and crime. There are challenges to doing so, but analytically, politically,
and ethically, it is crucial that we ask not whether, but only how, we can
advance these doctrines. Unprecedented times are not unthinkable ones.
Changes and differences in conditions of political violence must lead us
only and always back to universal principles of law advanced and
embodied in particular precedential laws. This method represents how,
and the U.S.-al Qaeda war shows why, constitutionalism surely must
exceed positivism. Otherwise, the inevitable descriptive distinctiveness
accompanying historical, geopolitical, and technological change will
perpetually leave us wholly without law amid terrible and terribly familiar scenes of war, torture, jail, and death-scenes that have perpetually
been our constitutional laws' origins and primary objects of address.

